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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Agnes Eileen Olsen for'the
Master of Arts in History presented July 7, 1989.
Title: Robert Francis Kelley and the Eastern European
Division of the State Department: 1917-1933.
This study traces the career of Robert Francis Kelley
and his influence on American-Russian Relations during the
nonrecognition period (1917-1933). The focus of this
examination is Kelley's role in formulating, implementing,
and sustaining America's anti-communist policy developed and
solidified during the 1920s and 1930s. Particular attention
is given to the senate recognition hearing of 1924, Kelley's
training of future diplomats (George Kennan, Charles Bohlen,
et al.), and his contributions to the preparations leading
to the United States' recognition of Russia in 1933. Using
Kelley's papers and personal correspondence, this study
shows the growth of a man and the evolution of a policy.
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INTRODUCTION
This study has been a search for Robert Francis
Kelley. Here, the goal has not been the acquisition of
facts but rather the meaning of those facts, particularly as
that meaning affected American-Russian relations during the
nonrecognition period (1917-1933).
It has not been an easy task. Kelley's was an elusive
personality -- his official writings are brilliantly cold,
his collection of personal papers disappointingly thin, his
diaries non-existent. His contemporaries labeled him
"useful," "taciturn," and "legalistic." Historians have
characterized him as "an astute student of Russian history,"
"a scholar by instinct and dedication," and "a bureaucratic
genius."
Yet, despite the thinness of the available material,
Kelley's role in formulating, implementing, and sustaining
America's anti-communist policy, developed and solidified
during the 1920's and early 1930's, has not been totally
ignored. He has been assigned a phrase, a sentence, a
paragraph by almost all historians of the period. As more
information has surfaced, he has commanded more space, and
the once-soft historical jUdgments have often hardened. Yet
Kelley, the man, has remained an enigma.
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There is nothing that whets the curiosity of the
student of history more than a man of mystery. Thus the
search began. The starting point was washington, D.C. Here
are found Georgetown University, home of Kelley's papers,
and the National Archives, where the documents of the
Eastern European Division of the state Department are
stored. The papers of his friends, John Wiley (FDR Library,
Hyde Park, N.Y.) and Samuel Harper (University of chicago,
Chicago) were very helpful. A personal interview with the
gracious and gregarious Earl Packer, Kelley's long-time
associate and his assistant chief in the Eastern European
Division, added to the Kelley mosaic. The Dewitt Poole,
William Phillips, and Eugene Dooman Papers contained in the
Oral History Collection at Columbia University provided
further insights and background.
The nonrecognition period has long attracted
historians. Every student of that period owes a huge debt
to those scholars, who with fewer available documents, have
recreated such accurate history. It must be stated --
however plagiaristically -- that if the present study has
any merit, it is because its author stood on the shoulders
of such giants. The pioneers include: Robert Paul Browder,
The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy; Donald G. Bishop,
The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements; and William Appleman
Williams, American-Russian Relations. Later studies
include: Thomas R. Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American
iv
Relations with the Soviet Union; Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology
and Economics; and John Richman, The united States and the
soviet union: The Decision to Recognize.
These are historians before whom one stands in awe,
and it is with a real sense of humility that this study has
taken issue with some of their conclusions. It is realized
that their searches and this search have been focused
differently. They have sought to understand and explain a
policy; to them Kelley was incidental to that policy. This
study, more narrowly focused, has sought to understand the
man in order to reexamine America's policy of the
nonrecognition of Soviet Russia.
Yet there is always a danger when a writer attempts to
recreate the life of a man, that an almost blind personal
relationship will develop between that writer and her
sUbject. A real effort has been made in this study to avoid
this "protective mother" pitfall. On the other hand, an
intellectual dilemma occurs when a 1980s liberal attempts to
analyze objectively a 1920s conservative and his anti-
communist stance. It offers little comfort to the writer to
realize during the agonizing throes of writing that her
sUbject most likely would have violently disagreed with her
conclusions and would probably have disliked her. It is
hoped that in this circumstance, Kelley would have reacted
with the same humor and goodwill as the Irish playwright,
Brendan Behan, who, while never forgiving his editor for
v
being English, was a big enough man to overlook the fact.
with Kelley, one wonders.
This study has attempted to show the growth of a man
and to explain the evolution of a policy. If in some small
measure it has succeeded, that success is due to the
author's fascination with her subjects.
CHAPTER I
KELLEY FACES BORAH
Even in Washington D.C. the hearing was not a front-
page story. On January 21, 1924 the Washington Post ran two
brief paragraphs on the second page under the heading,
"First Hearing Today on Russian Question." Senator William
Borah, chairman of the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations committee, had already received data from the
State Department, the newspaper reported, data which
supported Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes' position
"in maintaining his policy of pronounced opposition" to
recognition of the then six-year-old Soviet government of
Russia. Hughes was not expected to appear at the hearing
but had promised to send State Department representatives to
t' 1answer ques ~ons.
Subsequent news stories excited even less attention.
News of Lenin's death crowded coverage of the hearings off
the front page, and inside it was forced to compete for
space with surfacing reports of corruption in the cabinet of
the beloved, recently-deceased president, Warren G. Harding.
The Washington Post relegated its January 22 coverage to
page four and headlined the story, "Hughes Transmits
'The Washington Post, January 21, 1924, p. 2.
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Documents to Link Soviets with Plots. ,,2 Borah grabbed the
New York Times' headline: "Inquiry on soviet Is Begun by
Borah." This story, however, was positioned next to an
overpowering ad for raccoon coats.'
Three days after they began, the hearings were
suspended. Although it was intimated at the time that
uncertainty over Lenin's death prompted the suspension, it
is more likely that Borah realized he had been out-
maneuvered by Hughes.4 Eventually, the resolution to
recognize the soviet Russian government was shelved and with
it the hopes of the pro-recognitionists. The recognition
debate would not be resumed seriously until the advent of
the Great Depression.
However obscured in 1924, the recognition hearings
have not entirely escaped the prodding pens of historians,
who have tended to view them as a disaster for Borah and his
allies and a triumph for Hughes and his. This analysis,
though accurate, is nevertheless incomplete. The hearings
represented much more than a simple victory or defeat in a
battle between two powerful men and their rival
2The Washington Post, January 22, 1924, p. 4.
'The New York Times, January 22, 1924, p. 4.
4 •Marlan C. McKenna, Borah, p. 295. Senator George W.
Pepper, who served on the hearing committee, reported that
the resolution was shelved with "a decent regard" for
Borah's feelings. Ibid., p. 295. Also see: Peter G.
Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp. 91-92.
Filene writes that the hearing was suspended because of
scandals in Harding's cabinet.
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philosophies. Nonrecognition in 1924 set the course of
American foreign policy for the next nine years, years in
which strong sentiments of suspicion and opposition towards
communism, already present in the united states, hardened
into a solidly anti-communist ideology. Also of decided
significance, the hearings launched the career of a young
foreign service officer, Robert Francis Kelley.
Preparation for the hearings had begun in late April
1923, when three men of diverse background and colorful
personality -- Colonel Raymond Robins, Alexander Gumberg,
and Senator William Borah -- met to devise a strategy to
bring about recognition of Soviet Russia by the united
scat es ."
Robins, an idealist from humble beginnings, had been
in Russia during the November Bolshevik Revolution as a
member of the Red Cross team appointed by President Woodrow
Wilson in July 1917. A man of unusual courage, Robins,
after the fall of Kerensky's Provisional Government,
immediately forced a meeting with Trotsky to ask, "Can we
[continue to] serve the Russian people without injury to our
national interests ...?", Robins later served as an
5James K. Libbey, Alexander Gumberg and Soviet-American
Relations 1917-1933, p. 112.
'Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger, Efforts of Ravmond
Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the
Outlawry of War, 1917-1933, p. 20. Biographical information
about Robins can also be found in Libbey, Alexander Gumberg,
pp. 7-9; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp.
27-30; Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American
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intermediary between the American ambassador, David R.
Francis, and the Bolsheviks, and was thought to be closer to
Lenin and Trotsky and the Bolshevik program than any other
American in Russia at that time. Robins was not without his
detractors. Historian and diplomat George Kennan wrote, "By
nature a person wholly absorbed by contemporary realities,
his image of Russia in late 1917 had been gained from a few
intensive but brief and recent experiences and was lacking
in historical perspective.'"
Robins returned to the united states in June 1918,
determined to gain official recognition for the Bolshevik
government, only to find himself labeled a radical. This
was the period of the Red Scare, a time of near-national
hysteria. Robins' statement, "We are engaged in the task of
seeking to help the Russian people; not to support the
Bolshevik program either here ...or in Russia ... r II' was
either ignored or vilified. Robins was tenacious, however,
and by April 1923 he felt the opportune moment had arrived.
Joining Robins in his optimism was his friend,
Alexander Gumberg, a man often characterized as Robins'
alter-ego. Gumberg, a Russian-American New Yorker, had
traveled to Russia in the spring of 1917 as a sales
Foreign Policy, pp. 39-41; William Appleman Williams,
American - Russian Relations 1781-1947, pp. 50, 80-82, 89-
90.
'George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 63.
8Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 62.
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representative for several American business firms. He soon
severed his business ties in order to devote his energies to
translating for the many foreign journalists assigned to
Russia.9
Gumberg remains the sUbject of some controversy among
historians. His biographer, James K. Libbey, has taken
sharp issue with Kennan's statement that Gumberg, upon his
return to Russia in 1917, "thought of himself in those
months, as a Russian citizen.,,10 Libbey writes, "The record
indicates quite the opposite .... Gumberg became the
interpreter of two societies, sympathetic to both, yet
accepting their basic differences. Gumberg was able to
exist in two dimensions.,,11
Gumberg's wit was often sarcastic and he made enemies
easily. The usually tenderhearted John Reed assigned
Gumberg the pseudonym, "Trusishka" (which means "coward" in
Russian) in his book, Ten Days That Shook the World." But
whatever differences scholars may have concerning Gumberg's
personality and motivations, they agree that he was an
9Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 65; Meiburger,
Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 22. Biographical information
about Gumberg can be found in Maddox, William E. Borah, p.
198; Libbey, Alexander Gumberg; Williams, American-Russian,
pp. 110-11; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp.
88-89.
IOKennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 66.
"Libby, Alexander Gumberg, p. 18.
"Ibid., p , 19.
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indefatigable worker in his efforts to mediate a
reconciliation between America and Russia. By 1923 he had
become "a critical figure in coordinating the pUblic
campaign for recognition. ,,'3 It was only natural that he
would unite with the highest profile pro-recognitionist in
America, Senator William Borah."
Borah was an Illinoisan by birth, an Idahoan by
choice, and an individualist by tradition. His independence
of thought he may have owed to one of his paternal
ancestors, a German nun who left her convent to marry Martin
Luther. His gift of oratory apparently developed early
it was said that he addressed the farm animals in both
poetry and Latin exp Let.Lvesv"
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and
America's outraged reaction, Borah cautioned the Wilson
administration: "It would be well to modify our pretensions
of making the world safe for democracy. ,,16 In 1919 he
13Ibid., p. 103.
"Ibid., p. 104; Borah's career has been a popular
subject of historians. See: Marian C. McKenna, Borah;
Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy;
LeRoy Ashby, The Spearless Leader, Senator Borah and the
progressive Movement in the 1920's; Claudius o. Johnson,
Borah of Idaho; John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah and
the outlawry of War. For a contemporary view see: Walter
Lippmann, "Concerning Senator Borah," Foreign Affairs,
January 1926, Vol. IV, 2, pp. 211-222.
1~addox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy, p. xiv;
McKenna, Borah, p. 12.
'~addox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy, p. 34.
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attacked America's intervention in Russia: "I take the
position that the Russian people have the same right to
establish a socialistic state as we have to establish a
republic."" Borah continued to act as a vigilant critic of
America policy and became the congressional leader in the
battle for recognition of the Soviet government.
It was Gumberg who arranged the April, 1923, meeting.
Along with Robins and Borah, he invited the former governor
of Indiana, James P. Goodrich." Their immediate goal was to
convince the highest government officials that the existing
Russian policy needed to be revised. Goodrich was assigned
the task of arranging a meeting with President Warren
Harding. Robins was to prepare a detailed memorandum on the
current situation in Russia, outlining the detrimental
effects nonrecognition had already caused to American
interests there and stressing the need for increased trade,
and particularly the aid this would render to American
farmers. Meanwhile, Borah was to rouse support among the
press, around the country, and in Congress. Gumberg was to
17 bOdI ~ ., pp. 43-44.
"Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 112. James P. Goodrich
was from Indiana, a grain-growing state. He was concerned
with the farmers and felt recognition of the Soviet
government would open grain exports to Russia. See:
Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, pp. 73, 77-78;
Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 79-81, 95-98.
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organize an "Unofficial Congressional commission" which
would visit Russia during the summer of 1923."
In May 1923, Robins wrote a memorandum in which he
urged a "review of the policy determining Russian-American
relations." His justification for this review was "the
critical conditions now existing in the economic relations
between Russia and the rest of the world," which he felt to
be unsound and "a continuing and growing menace to the
economic welfare of America and the peace of the world. ,,20
On May 31, Robins sent the memorandum with a letter to
Goodrich. "Enclosed please find draft of suggestions for a
letter to the big chief upon Russian-American relations.""
Robins lunched at the White House with President and Mrs.
Harding on June 2, 1923. During the luncheon, Russia was
discussed. Noted historian William Appleman Williams claims
that at this meeting, Harding authorized Robins to make "a
confidential trip to Russia" and, if Robins felt "conditions
warranted recognition," Harding agreed "to reopen the
'9Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 109-110. The
commission included Congressman James A. Frear of Wisconsin,
Senators Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota and William H. King
of Utah. Upon their return, they were unanimous in their
call for renewed trade relations with Russia, p. 112.
2~eiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, Appendix C, pp.
202-206.
2'Ibid., p , 202.
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[Russian] question. ,,22 Using Williams' research as evidence,
other historians have restated the same finding. sister
Anne Vincent Meiburger, however, in recounting the event,
writes that "Harding declined to reconsider the Russian
question until he should return from the West. ,,23 James
Libbey, in Alexander Gumberg, openly takes issue with
Williams' assertion and writes, "While Williams' thesis is
interesting and logical, existing evidence is not
supportive.,,24 This argument, while interesting, becomes
inconsequential because, on August 2, 1923, during his
Western trip, Harding died and was succeeded in office by
his vice president, Calvin Coolidge.
Once again the group started fresh, but they were
increasingly hopeful. They believed Coolidge would be less
influenced than Harding by the two strongest architects of
the anti-communist nonrecognition policy -- Hughes and the
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. Coolidge liked and
respected Borah and often invited him to the White House to
listen to his views. Then, on December 1, 1923, Robins was
invited to have lunch with Coolidge, and they discussed the
22Williams, American-Russian Relations, p. 204.
William E. Borah cites Williams as his authority for
same statement, p. 200.
Maddox,
the
23Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 89.
24Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 113.
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Russian question for two hours. Robins wrote later to
Gumberg, "I felt Coolidge was really eager to act. ,,25
On December 6, 1923, Coolidge did act. In his state
of the Union message, he offered to the soviet Government
what was widely interpreted as an olive branch. "I do not
propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the
cherished rights of humanity," he stated:
But while the favor of America is not for sale, I
am willing to make very large concessions for the
purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already,
encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient
ways of society can be detected. But more are
needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to
compensate our citizens who are despoiled, and to
recognize that debt contracted with our Government,
not by the Czar, but by the newly-formed Republic of
Russia, whenever the active spirit of enmity to our
institutions is abated; whenever there appears [sic]
works meet for repentance; our country ought to be
the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of
Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire
to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we
can act.26
To the pro-recognitionists this message sounded
conciliatory and they responded immediately. Robins
prepared a soft reply for the soviet government which was
cabled to Moscow. 27 They were aware that Hughes would be the
greatest obstacle. "Hughes and Gompers will do all in their
26Robins to Gumberg, Ibid., p. 115.
26Papers relatinq to the Foreign Relations of the United
States (hereafter cited FRUS) , l:December 6, 1923, State of
the Union Message.
27Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 94.
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power to prevent the success of these negotiations," Robins
wrote Cumberg:
Only by a more willing spirit on the part of the
soviet leaders ...can we make good on this opening.
I am bringing all the guns I can man into action to
center on Coolidge ....It is indispensable for our
success that we get a favorable response from the
soviet government ...With a generous response ...we
can win.28
On December 16, C. M. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram directly to Coolidge,
which expressed the Soviet government's willingness "to
establish at last firm friendship with [the] people and
government [of the] united states." Conciliatory but not
humble, the Soviets offered to open negotiations based on
"mutual nonintervention" in internal affairs and stated that
the financial claims of both governments should be
recognized in order "to bring about the desired end of
renewal of friendship with the U.S."",
The message was received December 17. That same day,
Evan E. Young, head of the Division of Eastern European
Affairs of the State Department, sent a letter to Hughes.
I venture to suggest that a reply be made by
you ....It seems to me that our reply should be brief
and concise and of a nature which will not invite
negotiations or further communications unless the
Soviet authorities are, in fact, prepared to accept
28Rob ins to cumberg, December 1, 1923, quoted in
Mieburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 94. Samuel compers
was president of the American Federation of Labor and a
leading nonrecognitionist. See letter: Compers to Hughes
FRUS, 1923, Vol. II, July 9, 1923, pp. 758-760.
"'FRUS, 1:1923, p. 787.
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in full our three fundamental and essential
conditions.30
Young's letter has been largely ignored by historians,
a fact which has obscured the importance of the Eastern
European Division and its profound influence on united
states' policy concerning Russia.
Hughes swiftly responded to Young's suggestion. On
December 18, he sent Chicherin a brusque reply:
There would seem to be at this time no reason for
negotiations. The American government, as the
President said in his message to the Congress, is
not proposing to barter away its principles. If the
Soviet authorities are ready to restore the
confiscated property of American citizens or make
effective compensation, they can do so. If the
Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree
repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and
appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It
requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish
these results which can and should be achieved at
Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American
government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or
repUdiated obligations. Most serious is the
continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions
of this country. This government can enter into no
negotiations until these efforts directed from
Moscow are abandoned."
30Evan E. Young to Secretary of state Hughes, December
17, 1923, U.S. Department of State, National Archives
(hereafter cited as DSNA) , Record Group 59, File 711.61/71.
"FRUS, 2:1923, p. 788. Whether Hughes sent the message
before or after consulting Coolidge remains unclear. There
is a typed copy of the statement in the State Department
files, dated December 18, 1923, with some hand-written
corrections along with a note at the bottom in Hughes'
handwriting which reads: "Read by the President and
approved by him--December 18, 1923. CEH." There is also a
letter of the same date from Hughes to the President which
reads: "I enclose a copy of the statement which I have
given to the press." There are no notations by Coolidge on
either document. DSNA Record Group 59, File 711.61/71.
Whether or not Hughes acted on his own roused considerable
13
Hughes' telegram shocked the pro-recognitionists.
Borah was "dumbfounded" and returned battle in the
newspapers and on the Senate floor." Robins naively hoped
Hughes would be damaged enough to force his resignation.33
Gumberg was mystified.~ Undoubtedly in an attempt to
support his harsh position, Hughes, on December 19, 1923,
released a text of instructions to the Workers' Party of
America. Supposedly intercepted and purported to have been
issued by G. E. Zinoviev, president of both the Communist
International and the Petrograd Soviet, the documents
expressed the hope that the Workers' Party would "conquer
the proletarian forces of America and in the not-distant
future raise the red flag over the White House. ,,35
Although the Department of Justice had assured the
State Department of the authenticity of the documents, they
were swiftly branded as forgeries. "Secretary of State
Hughes is seeking to victimize the whole country with a
vicious frame up," C. E. Ruthenberg, Executive Secretary of
comment at the time and has teased the curiosity of
historians since.
"Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 20; Meinburger, Efforts
of Raymond Robins, p. 97.
"Ibid., p , 97.
~Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 115.
35FRUS, 2:1923, p , 790.
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the Workers' Party, wired the state Department on December
20.36
Borah lashed back at the state Department forces. In
an article published in the New York Times on December 30,
1923, he argued that the question of Russia's recognition
was one of a choice between "World Militarism or World
Peace ....Our people can and will easily withstand ...
propaganda ...our people cannot well withstand another World
War. ,,37
On January 7, 1924, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and
Borah debated the issue on the Senate floor. Lodge argued
that the Soviet government was making:
efforts to cause disorder and dissension among the
American people, ..which if successful would result
ultimately in the radical alteration and perhaps the
destruction of our present form of constitutional
government. 38
Borah, quoting Henry Clay, argued that "recognition did not
imply approval of the character of the government but rather
recognition that a government exists. ,,39Borah continued:
I am not interested in communism, I am not
interested in socialism ....I do not believe in
either one of them; but I look beyond that
36Ruthenberg to Hughes, December 20, 1923. DSNA, Record
Group 59, File 711.61/73.
"New York Times, December 30, 1923, reprinted in
Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st
Session, January 7, 1924, pp. 583-585.
38Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress,
1st Session, p. 592, January 7, 1924.
3'Ibid., p. 615.
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proposition. I wish to see if it is possible to
adopt a course and a policy which will tend to
minimize, destroy, and eliminate both theories.
There is just one form of government in which we
here believe, in which I believe and that is the
blessed old Republic. I believe ...that the best
way to maintain American principles is to extend
the doctrine of Americanism in so far as we can by
precept and example. outlawry of a nation
accompl ishes nothing. 40
Borah appended several documents to his remarks,
including two letters written by Assistant Attorney General
John W. H. Crim. Dated November 13, 1923 and December 4,
1923, the letters were written in answer to requests that
communists in America should be prosecuted under the Logan
Act. Crim wrote, "There has been a great deal of 'slush'
coming to my attention with reference to this act, but not
one single person has submitted a concrete statement of
facts."" crim's replies made clear that the Justice
Department did not have enough evidence to convict any
communist in America of violating this act.
On January 9, 1924, the waShington Post ran the story,
headlined, "Evidence of soviet Plots Against U.s. Lacking,
crim Says."" It was Hughes' turn to be outraged. He
4°Ibid., p , 620.
"Crim to Eben W. Burnstead, November 13, 1923; Crim to
Everett P. Wheeler, Esq., December 4, 1923, reprinted in
Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st
Session, January 7, 1924, p. 621. The Logan Act forbids a
citizen to correspond privately with any foreign government
or its agents in order to influence its actions towards the
united States.
"Washington Post, January 9, 1924.
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immediately sent a "Personal and Confidential" letter to
Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty. "I hope ...you will be
able to give a line to the press at once," he wr·ote. He
then suggested a statement:
Apart from the question of prosecutions or of
technical requirements to meet the provisions of
particular statutes, it should be clearly understood
that the Department of Justice has abundant evidence
to support the position of the Department of state,
with respect to communist propaganda, directed from
Moscow in this country. 43
On January 10, Daugherty obliged. The Washington Post
wrote, "Hughes' Anti-soviet Charges Backed by Attorney
General."" The New York Times wrote, "Daugherty Confirms
Moscow Propaganda."" This serves as an example of the
importance the State Department attached to the impending
hearing.
The hearing convened on the morning of January 21,
1924. outside, it was intensely cold. Northwest winds
aggravated numerous chimney fires, and the temperature
lingered around 10 degrees all day.
"Harry M. Daugherty, The Inside story of the Harding
Tragedy, pp. 208-209.
"Washington Post, January 10, 1924.
"New York Times, January 10, 1924. In his book, The
Inside Story, Daugherty writes, "Mr. Hughes was grateful to
me for the services I had rendered the Department of State
and at the next Cabinet meeting he pressed my hand and said,
'You're a brick.'" p. 209. Daugherty, who would soon be
forced to resign because of his part in the Harding
scandals, was bitterly anti-communist. See pp. 210-214.
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Inside, Evan E. Young, Chief of the Eastern European
Division of the state Department, and his assistant Robert
F. Kelley, faced a panel of Senators. After reading a brief
statement from Hughes, Young introduced his assistant: "Mr.
Kelley is the Russian expert of the division and he will
give you the contents [of the documents] and will be able to
translate from the Russian anything you desire. "," These
documents, Young continued, "are submitted to show that the
Russian communist Party controls what is known as the Soviet
government of Russia. 11'7 Young then turned the presentation
over to Kelley.
The individual who had been chosen to present the
State Department's case appeared no match for the
indomitable Borah. Not quite thirty years old, Kelley had
been hastily summoned to the Eastern European Division on
September 26, 1923, from his post in calcutta, India."
'"Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, united States Senate, sixty-Eighth
Congress, First Session, January 21, 22, 23, 1924. Pursuant
to S. Res. 50 Declaring That The Senate of the united States
Favors The Recognition of the Present Soviet Government of
Russia. (Hereafter cited: Hearings: Recognition of
Russia), p. 2.
"Ibid., p. 2.
"Kelley had been assigned to Calcutta in November 1922.
Although unhappy with the post, he had prepared such
excellent reports that letters of commendation had been sent
to both the Department of Commerce and the Department of
state. Letters and reports in Robert F. Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. (Hereafter cited as
Kelley Papers).
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Although Kelley was a newcomer to the department, he
was well informed on Russia. At Harvard he had studied
Russian history, literature, and language, and had planned
to do research in Russia and write his dissertation on the
crimean War. The Bolshevik Revolution had shattered that
dream. Kelley ended up in the army as a military attache
and observer assigned to the Baltic states.
There, on the Latvian-Russian border between 1920 and
1922, Kelley's view of the Bolsheviks and of communism first
crystallized. He witnessed the "terrible economic ruin of
the country" caused by a "brutal regime of terror and
governmental suppression." He observed the peasant
uprisings as "hunger increased in intensity." He saw the
"deceived masses, still hungry, cold and oppressed, open
their eyes." He viewed the reactions of the "American re-
emigrants, who were terrified when they saw the reality of
'Socialistic Paradise. ,,,49 He met the cultured but
bewildered emigrees who had left their palaces and jewels
behind and now clung only to their memories. He interviewed
courageous soldiers from the White armies, who were willing
to risk their lives again if only the West would help.
In the end, Kelley became emotionally attached to
these people as only an unemotional man can become attached
"See: Kelley's Report No. 43, dated April 13, 1921,
"Causes, Progress, and Results of Cronstadt Events" and
Report of Descriptions of Bolshevik Government, September
1922. Kelley Papers.
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-- with his mind. He committed himself to them as he had
committed himself to their history, language and literature
during his student days at Harvard. It was a commitment the
erudite scholar would honor all the days of his life.
Though far less voluble in his expressions, Kelley held his
convictions just as passionately as the Senator from Idaho.
At the time of the hearing, Borah commanded great
prestige. "He knows what is theatrically effective," wrote
Walter Lippmann, one of the best-known journalists of the
day. "He has an air of common sense, a resourcefulness, and
an eloquence which have made him the most successful debater
in the Senate ....For some subtle reason, Borah does not make
enemies of his opponents.,,50
Although Lippmann's description may have represented
the majority view, Borah's popularity was not universal.
"We were agin [sic] him. We thought he was nuts," recalled
Earl Packer. "We didn't have any great fondness for him.
We couldn't say he was unaware -- but we couldn't understand
how a person with his opportunities wasn't more informed.
We disagreed 100% with Borah. We wanted the best for our
country vis-a-vis Russia and a lot of other countries. And
SOWalter Lippmann, "Concerning Senator Borah," Foreign
Affairs, January 1926, Vol. IV, 2, p. 214.
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Borah was not willing to look at the facts with an open
mind. ,,51
His skill at debate notwithstanding, Borah lost the
initiative within the first five minutes. He was painfully
unfamiliar with the simplest facts, while Kelley was fUlly
informed. The following dramatizes the gap separating the
two men's knowledge.
Senator Borah. You say it [Kelley's evidence] shows
the control of the Soviet Government by the Communist
Party?
Mr. Kelley. By the Russian Communist Party.
Senator Borah. Would it be equally true to say that
it shows the control of the Communist Party by the
Soviet Government?
Mr. Kelley. No, sir.
Senator Borah. Why Not?
Mr. Kelley. Because the control is exercised by the
communist Party and not by the Soviet Government.
Senator Borah. If the parties are the same, neither
one has a right to dictate to the other?
Mr. Kelley. But the one has a right to dictate to the
other, because our proof will show that the activities
"Interview with Earl L. Packer, Retired, formerly of
the State Department, Division of Russian Affairs (became
Division of Eastern European Affairs October 10, 1922) from
1921-1936. Interview held February 15, 17, 1989 in New York
City. (Hereafter cited Packer Interview).
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of the soviet Government are determined by the
Communist Party.
Senator Borah. Did it determine the new economic
policy of the Soviet Government?
Mr. Kelley. Yes.
Senator Borah. Did not zinoviev oppose that policy?
Mr. Kelley. certain members of the party opposed it.
Senator Borah. Did not Zinoviev oppose it bitterly?
Mr. Kelley. He did not oppose it bitterly; when the
decision was made by the political bureau, Zinoviev
dropped his opposition and supported Lenin.
Senator Borah. And he has continued to criticize it
up to this day?
Mr. Kelley. No, Zinoviev has not.
Senator Borah. Are you sure of that?
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
Senator Borah. You are satisfied of that, are you?
Mr. Kelley. Yes sir.~
Kelley's organizational plan was as brilliant as it
was simple. The economic and diplomatic issues were
ignored. Communist propaganda and the national security of
the united States were the focal points. Kelley and the
State Department presentation had three goals:
52Hearings: Recogni tion of Russia, p. 5.
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1. To prove the essential unity of the various
groups at Moscow, whether under the name of the
Third International, the Russian Communist
Party, or the Soviet Government.
2. To explain the relationship between those groups
and their subordinate groups in the united
States.
3. To demonstrate the activities of the subordinate
groups in the united States.53
In order to accomplish these goals, Kelley never let
the initiative slip from his control. In a masterful
stroke, he introduced letters confirming that the "Red Flag
over the White House" document was a forgery. Again and
again, Borah was pushed into a defensive position. Worst of
all, he was unprepared." Following the first day's noon
recess, Borah insisted on reading into the record a portion
of the constitution of "The Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics." After the reading, Kelley said, "The
constitution read by the Chairman is the constitution of the
original Soviet Republic. That is not the constitution of
53Ibid., p. 59. Also see Maddox analysis of hearings
results, Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 207.
"Hearings, Recognition of Russia. Also see: Klieforth
to Harper, Harpers Papers, University of Chicago.
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the soviet Federation, which is the international entity ....
I have the constitution of the soviet Federation [USSR].,,55
The battle was brief and decisive. Had Borah admitted
that the soviet Government was an atheistic class
dictatorship which deserved recognition simply because it
was the de facto government of Russia, perhaps the result
would have been different. Instead, he became an apologist
for the regime, based on the proposition that positive
changes were occurring in the Soviet government. Kelley's
testimony and evidence at the hearing destroyed Borah's
argument.
In a penetrating analysis, historian Peter Filene has
written that failure to take up the "amoral" argument
provokes "the suspicion that perhaps at heart [Borah,
Robins, et al.] too wanted to recognize only a liberal and
democratic Soviet regime.,,56
For Kelley, the Eastern European Division, and Hughes,
the hearings were a success. They had put the question of
55 bidIl.,p.28.
56Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, p. 92.
Also see: Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the
Russian Revolution, p. 217, and Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology
and Economics, p. 30, footnote 19. It is of some interest
that the reports Borah requested from Hughes were never sent
to the hearings. (The State Department claimed they were
lost.) The reports requested were written by William Boyce
Thompson, Col. Raymond Robins, General Graves, Governor J.
P. Goodrich, Major Slaughter and Major Faymonville. All
these men had sent formal reports in the past to the State
Department which Borah felt supported his position. See
Borah's request in Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1,
68th Congress, 1st Session, January 7, 1924, p. 626.
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recognition to rest, at least temporarily, and they would
now be able to concentrate on protecting the united states
from Soviet propaganda, which they feared threatened to
"overthrow the political and economic structure of the
country. ,,57
On January 25, 1924, Hughes wrote Kelley a letter of
commendation: "Both the preparation of the case, as well as
the manner of presentation, left nothing to be desired, and
I know, both from my own experience, as well as from what
Mr. Young tells me, how important a part you played
throughout. "",
Young's review of Kelley was no less laudatory. "Mra
Kelley possesses unquestionably an usually fine and well
disciplined mental equipment, ..." he wrote. His reports
"are marked by an orderly and logical method, ...a
thoroughness which leaves nothing to be desired. The
foregoing is, of course, unusually high commendation, but
judged squarely by his work, I can say no less.,,59
From the date of the hearing, Kelley's fate was
determined. He was, as Young wrote, "One of the few
outstanding students of Russia ...,,60 in the country.
57Packer Interview, February 17, 1989.
"'Hughes to Kelley, January 25, 1924, Kelley Papers.
59Evan Young to Mr. Eberhardt, Personnel, November 1,
1924, pp. 1-2. Kelley Papers.
6°lb .d1.,p.2.
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Unofficially awarded the title of Russian expert of the
state Department, it was only a matter of time until he




state Department officials were stunned by events in
Russia in 1917. In March, revolutionaries seized control of
the Czarist government, and within days the 300-year-old
Romanov dynasty vanished. An untried, unstable republic
emerged in the form of a provisional government -- a
government President Woodrow Wilson characterized as "a fit
partner" for the united states. While the government and
people of the united states joyfully embraced the new order,
emotionally, ideologically and economically, the state
Department was ill-prepared to cope with the speed and
complexity of unfolding events in Russia. Then, on April 6,
1917, the United states entered the World War, which only
compounded the confusion. Unprepared to manage effectively
the escalating diplomatic disorder, state Department
officials responded to the crisis on October 16, 1917, by
creating a special section -- the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs -- Russia." The section was barely functional,
·'This section evolved into the Russian Division (August
13, 1919) and later the Division of Eastern European Affairs
(October 10, 1922). As the youngest politico-geographic
division, it "didn't rank in the same category as the Latin
American or Western European Divisions. We had to prove
ourselves as being an important department for matters in
our bailiwick." Packer Interview, February, 1989. Also
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when, on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks captured control
in Petrograd and formally announced the overthrow of the
provisional government.
From that moment, the officers of the new Russian
Division were assigned the task of comprehending this second
revolution which President Wilson and the rest of the state
Department already had rejected on its face as
incomprehensible. The rhetoric reverberating from the
Bolsheviks called for an end to the War, preached the
overthrow of legitimate governments everywhere, advocated
the destruction of capitalism and all the bourgeoisie, and
urged a universal dictatorship of the proletariat. That one
of the last great empires of Europe, with a population of
140 million people, was now in the controlling clutches of a
little band of revolutionaries was simply not to be
understood. And certainly not by a president or a country
fighting a war "to make the world safe for democracy."
The challenge facing the officials of the Russian
Division was two-fold. First, was the difficulty of
obtaining accurate information on the rapidly changing and
often confusing events occurring inside the vast country of
Russia. Even more frustrating was the fact that once a
see: "Division of Eastern European Affairs," The American
Foreign Service Journal, May-June 1934, pp. 54-61, copy in
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University. Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace, implies that the division was established
as a direct response to the Bolshevik Revolution. In this
instance, he is in error, pp. 18-19.
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reliable information network had been developed, the
officials found that their recommendations were often
ignored. Eventually, however, their dedication was
rewarded, and they became the state Department's
acknowledged experts on American-Soviet relations. The
contributions of these men were significant, for their
actions and opinions were instrumental in establishing the
ground rules for the united states' recognition of Soviet
Russia rules which translated effectively into a policy
of nonrecognition. Moreover, they set a precedent which the
division would follow throughout its existence, one of
employing only officers who had previously served in the
Eastern European field.6' This was the policy and the
department which Kelley would inherit and personalize with
his own high standards. Kelley's predecessors are largely
forgotten now, their achievements ignored, their biographies
unwritten. Nevertheless, they left their imprint on both
the policy and the department, and for that reason alone, if
for no other, they deserve at least a brief mention in this
narrative.
Basil Miles was appointed head of the Russian Division
at the time of its creation. Miles possessed all the usual
qualifications of an early twentieth century united states
6'Between 1917 and 1934 there were thirty-three officers
assigned to the Russian Division. Of these, all but seven
had had "field" experience in the Eastern European area.
The American Foreign service Journal, May-June 1934, p. 55.
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diplomat: a wealthy eastern seaboard family --
Philadelphians, in Miles' case, a fine education, which had
included travel and study abroad, correct manners and social
connections. After a brief bout with business (1899-1901),
and an equally short stint teaching at a private academy
(1901-03), Miles had begun his pUblic career in 1905 as
personal secretary to George von Lengerke, Ambassador to
Russia under President Theodore Roosevelt. Miles stayed in
Russia after Von Lengerke's departure as Third Secretary of
the Embassy. 63
Miles came back to the united States in 1907, then
returned to Russia as Special Assistant to Ambassador David
Francis in charge of Austro-Hungarian and German interests.
He surrendered these duties in April, 1917, as a consequence
of the united States' entry into the War. Subsequently, in
May and June 1917, Miles served as Secretary of the Special
Root Mission to Russia. He predicted at that time that
hunger in Petrograd was sUfficiently severe to be considered
a political factor which could bring about "the downfall of
the present regime and ... possibly the total withdrawal of
Russia from the war. ,,64 After completing his assignment with
63Biographical information about Miles can be found in
William Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-
1947, pp. 87, 108; Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the
Diplomatic Mind, p. 147.
64The Root Mission was a goodwill mission headed by the
aged, distinguished, conservative Elihu Root, who had been
appointed by President Wilson. Its purpose was to encourage
the Provisional Government to continue the Russian War
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the Root Mission, Miles returned to Washington to assume new
duties in the Russian Division.
During the two years Miles was chief of the division,
united States' relations with Russia were "dominated by
considerations arising out of the World War."" These
considerations, as later summarized by Kelley and Dewitt
Poole, included the Bolshevik revolution, armistice with the
Central Powers, repudiation of foreign state loans and
abolition of private ownership of real estate, evacuation of
Petrograd, and intervention. 66
The overriding question, however, was whether the
united States should recognize the Bolshevik government. It
was to this question that Miles directed his keenest
attention, and it was upon this proposition that he effected
the most influence. At no time did he favor even de facto
recognition of the Soviet government. In all probability,
effort. The group was in Russia part of May and June 1917.
The mission at the time and later was judged to be a dismal
failure. George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 19-24;
also see, William Appleman Williams, American Russian
Relations, 1781-1947. Williams writes: "Both the final
composition of the mission itself and the directive issued
by Wilson revealed a tragic failure to face the issue in
Russia." p. 87. Williams exempts Miles from his harsh
criticism.
65Kelley to Dewitt C. Poole, February 2, 1933, Kelley
Papers, Georgetown university, Washington, DC.
"Poole to Kelley, January 19, 1933; Kelley to Poole,
February 2, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC. This is only a partial list which Poole and
Kelley outlined in preparation for a proposed history of
American-Russian Relations.
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his recommendations were seriously considered when policy
was made. The high esteem in which he was held by President
Wilson, who considered him "capital," supports this
azqumerrtc " Secretary of State Robert Lansing also had great
confidence in Miles. At Lansing's request, Miles screened
visitors, interpreted the rapidly changing events in Russia,
and prepared reports.
Miles likewise made it difficult for anyone who
attempted to undercut his position. Worried that Ambassador
Francis might be unduly influenced by Raymond Robins, who
was actively working to bring about recognition, Miles
suggested firm "instructions"· be sent to Francis. Miles'
disdain for Robins' position was so pronounced that upon
Robins' return to the united States, Miles virtually
throttled Robins' plans to present his case to top-level
State Department officials. Miles even arranged to have
Robins' luggage searched upon his arrival in Seattle. 69
Nevertheless, while Miles opposed de facto
recognition, there is some evidence that he favored
"contact" with the BoLahev i.kav" In February 1918, in a memo
to Lansing, he wrote that "all observers returning from
67William Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations,
1781-1947, p. 108.
68Ibid., p. 137.
69Ibid., p , 146.
70George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 385-86.
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Russia seem agreed that the unbending adherence to this
policy of holding absolutely aloof has been aggravating, has
even tended to throw the Bolsheviks into the hands of the
Germans. ,,71 In an earlier memo he had suggested that the
time had come "to deal unofficially" with all parties in
Russia, including the Bolsheviks. ,,72 This sleight of hand
diplomacy was as unworkable as it was dishonest, and only
led to confusion for the Americans still officially and
unofficially inside Russia.
Dewitt Poole replaced Miles as chief of the division
on October 1, 1919, following his return from Moscow and
Archangel, where he had been assigned as Consul General.
Poole had been in Moscow at the time of the November
Revolution, which unlike the relatively bloodless uprising
in Petrograd, had been the scene of a bitter battle for
control. The fighting had lasted nearly a week, and
although in grave personal danger, Poole had valiantly
protected the Americans remaining in Moscow. He was later
commended for heroism by the State Department. 73
"National Archives, state Department File 861. 01j14L
quoted in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 393.
"George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 392.
73Ibid., p. 74. For more on Poole's activities in
Russia during 1917-1918 see Ibid., pp. 170-183, 447-448,
472. Also see: Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-
1947, pp. 119, 145, 151. Poole actually served in the
Russian Division from October 1, 1919 until March 20, 1920
when he went on an extended leave of absence. He returned
April 27, 1921 and served until September 30, 1923. (Evan
Young was officially appointed chief on July 3, 1923, but
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The son of a military man, Poole's courage under fire
and his dedication to public service were ingrained in
childhood. Speaking of his family, he later recalled that
"I grew up in genteel poverty, compensated for very largely
by a sense of the distinction of pUblic service. We were
aware of, I think it's fair to say, a certain well-bred
snobbery, in that we were, after all, in the aristocratic
tradition of pUblic service."" Poole prided himself on
being an independent thinker and traced this trait also back
to his upbringing. "We were not," he said, "very affected
by fashions of thought. ,,75 He was often a severe critic of
his fellow diplomats. In describing a colleague, he once
said, "[He was] a typical diplomat, a man of charm and
considerable ability ...[but] he lacked imagination and was
unready for anything outside of routine at a higher level.,,76
In a comparison of Russians and Americans, Poole
echoed observations made by Alexis de Tocqueville a century
earlier. "That is the great distinction between the
Russians and the Americans. We have terrible social tyranny
here. We have to like the same theatres, movies, music ....
due to illness was unable to immediately assume his duties.)
The American Foreign Service Journal, May-June, 1934, pp.
54-55.
"DeWitt C. Poole, Oral History Collection, Columbia
University, New York City, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as
Poole's Oral History.)
75Ibid., p , 4.
"Ibid., p. 450.
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Russia, throughout history, has had political tyranny but
social liberty, at least up to the Bolshevik Revolution.""
Under Poole's tutelage, the Russian Division became an
academic center for "collecting, collating and interpreting
information about Russia. ,,7.Samuel N. Harper, a professor
from the University of Chicago, and one of the few scholars
of Russia in the united states, served as a special
assistant in the department during Poole's tenure. Harper
described the department as "a kind of embassy-in-exile.""
There, Harper and the officers of the division translated
Russian newspapers, studied documents, and analyzed reports
made by Russian refugees. Their goal was to gain an
understanding of the "fundamental Bolshevik principles,
methods, and aims -- covering the character of their rule,
the economic results of Bolshevik control, and the program
of world revolution. ".0
Between October 1919 and October 1920, the division
published three detailed memoranda, whose contents were
"Ibid., p. 4.
7·samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 126.
"Ibid., p. 126. Poole said of Harper, "We all loved
him." The Oral History Collection. Poole's Oral History,
Columbia University, New York. The Samuel Harper Papers,
University of Chicago, are also indispensable for their
insight into the thinking of the officers of the Russian
Division. The collection has a large number of semi-
official and personal letters which were exchanged between
Harper and the staff members of the Russian Division.
80 bOdIl.., p. 128.
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communicated to the Congress and the American people, in
order that they might better understand the leadership's
policy of nonrecognition. These original academic studies
became a blueprint for later reserach. Actual communist
documents were collected which demonstrated the soviet's
ambition to export communism world-wide. The linkage
between the Bolsheviks, the Russian Soviets, and the
communist International was sharply illustrated." In
addition to serving as an expose of Soviet intent, the
memoranda developed a justification for the State
Department's unyielding nonrecognition policy. Two years
after the Revolution, it had become increasingly difficult
to characterize the Bolshevik leaders as simply a little
group of unstable, unrepresentative insurrectionists.
Consequently, with the passage of time, the State Department
sought a new rationale to justify its persistent refusal to
recognize officially the despised regime. The Soviets
obligingly provided such a rationale by grinding out
revolutionary communist propaganda exhorting the "wage
slaves" of the world to rise up against their capitalist
masters.
The communists' propaganda was carefully skewed to
appeal to the American masses -- the underpaid workers, the
"Ibid., p. 128-129. Also see Frederic Propas, "The
State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and Soviet-American
Relations 1918-1938," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1982), pp. 18-24.
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oppressed Negroes -- and the utopian intellectuals. If the
atheistic rulers of the new Russia wrapped a Christian
message -- however unintentionally around their radical
rhetoric, it was uniformly ignored in the united states.
The American pUblic was not disposed to accept criticism
graciously, and its business and political leaders dismissed
with anger and contempt any disturbance of their collective
conscience.
And so the policy makers rose in majestic arrogance
and refused to acknowledge the existence of the Soviet
Government. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes
personified this attitude. Harper once showed him a cartoon
from a Moscow newspaper which pictured Hughes trembling as
he studied Moscow propaganda. Hughes laughed, Harper
reported, "...then, turning serious, [Hughes] remarked that
one of the troubles was that Moscow thought we were afraid
of its propaganda and did not realize that it was simply a
matter of self-respect. We didn't like it, and we weren't
going to stand for it. ,,82
Hughes was not only architect of the policy but
champion of the nonrecognitionists. Hughes' biographer,
Betty Glad, argues that Hughes' position was based on the
realization that the United States had become a "major
power." As the "leading creditor nation of the world" it
was incumbent upon the United States to establish
"Samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 130.
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"international standards for the protection of private
property rights." Thus, reasoned Hughes, the soviets'
repudiation of the debts incurred by the Provisional
Government and the confiscation of property of American
citizens, explicitly demonstrated that they were ineligible
for "membership in the family of nations. ,,83 Hughes, whom
William Castle has characterized as "the most perfect mental
machine in the world,"" was a demanding taskmaster, yet he
commanded the respect of all the officials of the Russian
Division, even the liberal socialist, Arthur Bullard.
Bullard was Chief of the Russian Division from
November 1920 to March 1921. By profession a journalist and
novelist, Bullard was a cosmopolite, well-read and widely
traveled. He has been characterized by the astute critic,
George Kennan, as "a genuine idealist."" Long interested in
Russian affairs, Bullard had been Secretary of the American
Friends of Russian Freedom, a group of American liberals who
actively supported efforts to bring about political liberty
in czarist Russia. A small, diffident man, Bullard was
thirty-eight at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and
was,in the words of Kennan, "the best American mind
83Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of
Innocence, pp. 312-313.
"Ibid., p. 98. Castle served as assistant Secretary of
State.
"George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 47. Also
see: Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment,
1917-1933, pp. 31-33.
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observing on the spot the course of the Russian
Revolution."'" Despite his socialist leanings, Bullard
advised against recognizing the Bolsheviks. He jUdged them
to be "cold-blooded in their disregard for the truth" and as
"undemocratic ... as the former Tsar."" Although at no time
did he favor even de facto recognition, he, like Miles,
concluded that some contact with the Bolshevik Government
was desirable.
Bullard's analyses were coolly intellectual and his
opinions universally respected by state Department
officials. He had little ambition to pursue a career as a
diplomat. "Personally I would rather be engaged in molding
pUblic opinion at home than in registering its decisions as
a diplomat," he said.'" Bullard's tenure as chief of the
Russian Division was brief but his jUdgments were grounded
on firm scholarship and his influence should not be
overlooked.
While Bullard has been described as an idealist, Evan
Young, who was appointed Chief of the newly expanded Russian
Division on July 3, 1923, is best described as a realist.
As a young man, Young had served in the military, and,
following his education, had briefly practiced law. In 1905
he had opted for a career as a foreign service officer, and
88 bidI 1 ., p. 49.
87 bidI 1 ., p . 270.
"'Ibid., p. 28.
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at the time of his appointment in 1923, Young was regarded
as one of the most knowledgeable Americans on matters
concerning the Bolsheviks.M After the withdrawal American
diplomats from Russia in 1918, the capable and experienced
Young had been instructed to set up an observation post in
Riga, Latvia. Here, between 1918 and 1922, Young supervised
the collecting and analyzing of information on the
activities of the Bolsheviks.oo
Based upon this research, Young accurately predicted
the durability of the Bolshevik government. On July 23,
1920, he wrote the Secretary of State, "In submitting
certain suggestions regarding our policy ... I wish to
emphasize the fact that the Soviet Government ... is now
[far] stronger than for months past and that there is no
sign either external or internal of force or movement which
might eventually bring about its overthrow."" One of
Young's greatest strengths was his ability to recognize and
recruit able men to serve in the Division, and he was
instrumental in the recruitment of both Kelley and Loy
Henderson to the Russian Division.
·Propas, see note 34, pp. 31-32.
OOIbid., p. 32. For information on the Riga observation
post, see Natalie Grant, "The Russian section. A Window on
the Soviet Union," Diplomatic History, 2, (Winter), 1978;
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 19-20.
"FRUS, 2:1920, p. 652.
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The respect accorded Young by his colleagues is
illustrated by a letter Earl Packer wrote from Reval,
Estonia in 1922, following Young's departure from the
Baltics:
The field work has been very
Young's very able direction.
on the Russian situation---a
student."
interesting under Mr.
He is very, very sound
close, sane and careful
The high esteem with which Young was regarded by state
Department officials is revealed by his appointment as Chief
of the Russian Division after its expansion. On October 10,
1922, following recognition by the united states of the new
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Division of
Russian Affairs had become a full-fledged politico-
geographic division with the designation "Division of
Eastern European Affairs. Under a state Department order of
October 10, 1922, the Division had assumed general
supervision of matters pertaining to Russia, Finland and
Poland, in addition to the three newly established Baltic
republics. Young's career has been neglected by historians,
but the available evidence supports the argument that his
contributions to the Russian Division and to the observation
post in Riga were immeasurable and that the importance the
department sUbsequently achieved is directly traceable to
his able leadership.
9'Earl Packer to Samuel Harper, October 22, 1922.
Harper Papers, University of Chicago.
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Several other personalities formed the group which
made up the early members of "EE," as the division was
called. Foremost among them was the gregarious Earl Packer,
who was in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution, and who
spent time in Riga and in the Russian Division. Packer was
a man with a whimsical nature. In 1917, at twenty-three,
while serving with the War Department, he impulsively
volunteered to go to Petrograd as a military clerk. While
there, he became an assistant to an American military
attache and eventually ended up at the Riga observation
post.93 Like Kelley, Packer I s commitment to the displaced
Russian emigrees would last a lifetime.
While in Petrograd, Packer met Alfred Klieforth,
another "EE" member. During 1917, they roomed together in
an apartment owned by three Russian sisters, one of whom
Klieforth later married. Unlike Packer, Klieforth could not
be considered a true Sovietologist, nevertheless his
contributions to the department broadened the informational
base of the Russian Division during its formative years.
Klieforth had served as a clerk in the American
Embassy in Petrograd in 1916 and as a passport control
officer in Finland during and after the War. Between 1920
"Packer Interview; Also see: Foy D. Kohler and Mose L.
Harvey, editors, The Soviet union: Yesterday. Today,
Tomorrow, A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow,
Monographs in International Affairs (Coral Gables: Center
for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami,
1975) pp. 157-163. (Hereafter cited Long Timers)
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and 1924, he was assigned to the Russian Division and later
was sent to the observation station at Riga.94
During 1921 and 1922, Klieforth was responsible for
analyzing the "economic content of all the recent 'new
measures,' the alleged economic concessions," then being
implemented within soviet Russia.~ It will be remembered
that during this period the concepts of "private property,"
"capitalistic methods" and "individualistic conceptions"oo
were in a period of flux in Russia. The New Economic Policy
(NEP) was being initiated and tested, albeit reluctantly.
Lenin, in defense of this shift in policy, had said, "It is
necessary to permit the capitalism which we have permitted;
if it proves unsatisfactory and bad, we can correct it,
because we have authority in our hands, and therefore we
have no reason to fear. ,,97The officers of the Russian
Division viewed this shift in policy with suspicion.
Klieforth warily charged that the NEP had "communist
strings" attached. "I think ... the government definitely
Mpropas, "The state Department ...·',p. 77.
~Harper to Klieforth, June 81, [sic] 1921. Harper
Papers, University of Chicago.
96Research Paper, "Reflections"
Harper to Klieforth, May 11, 1922.
University of Chicago.




and with serious forethought attaches strings,,,98he wrote
Harper in May 1922.
A stern anti-communist, Klieforth had little patience
with writers who disagreed with the department's position.
commenting on a contemporary book, he wrote, "Ross' book is
among the worst in our Zoo of atrocities.,,99 Kleiforth was
also actively involved in the recognition hearings of 1924.
Pleased with the results, which heralded a victory for those
opposing recognition, he wrote, "The show went off
beautifully. ,,'00 After leaving Washington in 1924, Klieforth
was assigned to Riga for two years. He later served in
Germany and throughout Europe, but his personal
correspondence reveals that his interest in soviet Russia
never diminished. tot
Loy Henderson was another of the early officers who
staffed the Russian Division. His name is most often
associated with events following recognition of Russia, when
9'Ibid. Kl ieforth, as requested by Harper had made
personal notes and comments in the margins of the research
paper.
99Klieforth to Harper, December 8, 1923, Harper Papers,
University of Chicago. Harper in a letter to Klieforth
wrote, "What cheap stuff he [Ross] hands out. And what a
lot of misstatements or partisan statements." Harper
Papers, University of Chicago.
'OOKlieforth to Harper, February 4, 1924, Harper Papers,
University of Chicago.
'''JohnWiley to Klieforth, December 22, 1933, Wiley to
Klieforth, February 21, 1935, John Wiley Papers, General
Correspondence I-K, Box 7, Franklin Roosevelt Presidential
Library, Hyde Park. (Hereafter cited, Wiley Papers.)
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he was assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow, but his
unshakable anti-communist views were first formulated during
his early training in Riga and in the Department of Russian
Affairs. He never wavered in either his distrust of the
soviets nor in his feeling of utter repugnance for their
socialist philosophy. 102
There were others, often faceless personalities,
associated with the Department during those early years
Felix Cole, Preston Kumler, Orsen Nielsen. Fragments of
history, their names fleetingly appeared on the official
records, but now their stories are lost. Some of them
sought anonymity in their own time. Two such men were Ray
Murphy and an elusive "Carter." Years later, Packer
attempted to explain their activities:
Carter studied communist activities in the united
states. He had a room somewhere in the
department ... sub rosa, probably. Ray Murphy? Oh,
yes, he's another one. I have a hard time defining
the scope of Ray's activities. I suspect that Ray
Murphy and Carter succeeded one another--without
knowing the facts. It's too remote. 103
10'Henderson to Wiley, December 19, 1939, Wiley Papers,
FDR Library. Henderson wrote, "The feeling against the
Soviet union has reached a high pitch. For the first time
in many years the American people are really commencing to
understand something about the Soviet Union." Also see,
Long Timers, p. ix. Henderson's views are stated throughout
this colloquy.
103PackerInterview, February 1989, New York City.
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A former state Department officer described Murphy as
Kelley's "gumshoe man." Murphy compiled files on soviet
propaganda and subversion agents in the United states.1O'
It is significant that although the first chiefs of the
Russian Division had diverse backgrounds, they shared a
common distrust of the Bolsheviks. Miles, the professional
diplomat, disliked the Bolshevik's approach to social
justice.105 Poole believed the Bolsheviks betrayed the war
effort and the Allies and were in collusion with the
Germans. Bullard mistrusted the Bolshevik's intentions and
methods, and Young realized that the Bolshevik revolution
represented a permanent political and social change in
Russia. In accordance with these attitudes, they saw the
new government as representing an enemy who must be studied.
At no time did they contemplate recognition as a viable
option. It is understandable, then, that they were united
in their promotion of the United states' policy of
nonrecognition.
In contrast to the elusiveness which plagues the
researcher striving to uncover and understand the thinking
1O'ThomasF. Troy, "Ah, Sweet Intrigue! Or, Who Axed
State's Prewar soviet Division?", Foreign Intelligence
Literary Scene, Vol. 3, No.5, October 1984, p. 2, copy of
article, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University.
I~Basil Miles to Harper, April 22, 1920. Miles was
commenting on strikes in America as a viable method to re-
adjust "social conditions which our Bolshevik friends are so
anxious to accomplish at once for mankind by force." Harper
Papers, University of Chicago.
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and motivation of the forgotten men of the Russian Division,
their policy recommendations appear straightforward and
definite. They can be summarized as follows:
Recognition was impossible as long as soviet Russia 1)
refused to settle the debts contracted by the Provisional
Government, 2) refused to compensate Americans whose
property inside Russia had been confiscated, and 3) refused
to stop sending communist propaganda into the united states.
This would continue to be the position of the united states
government until 1933.
The nonrecognition policy will be analyzed in the
following chapter. Suffice it to state at this point that
the policy was firmly in place by the time Kelley was
appointed chief of the Division in 1925, and that it would
be Kelley who would have to face the first serious challenge
to that inflexible policy. Ironically enough, it was the
united States courts which would compel that reevaluation.
CHAPTER III
THE KELLEY APPROACH
On November 22, 1924, an unexpected cable from the
American Legation at Riga, Latvia jarred the solid
foundation upon which the officers of the Eastern European
Division had erected their nonrecognition policy. Not since
the recognition hearings of the previous January had the
state Department been faced with a more lethal challenge to
the legitimacy of its position in denying diplomatic
recognition to the soviet Government. That this unexpected
defiance had originated in the united states courts only
added to their dismay. The officers' reactions ranged from
frustrated indignation to outright apprehension. The
offending cable read: Judgment of American Supreme Court
Alleged to Imply Recognition of the Sovereignty of the
s .s .s .R. 106
The jUdgment in question concerned the case of Max
Wulfsohn et al., v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
l06J. C. White, Charge d'Affaires, American Legation,
Riga to State Department, "Report No. 606." October 28,
1924, DSNA, Record Group 59, File 711.61/95. Also see:
361.1153 W 95.
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Republic, Appellant, \07a case which had been argued in the
New York Supreme Court in 1922 and 1923. The question
before the Court had been "Can the defendant [S.S.S.R.]
which has not been recognized as a sovereign state by the
united states government be sued in the courts of this state
[N.Y.] as a foreign corporation?,,'08 The majority opinion,
written by Judge J. Andrews and supported by five concurring
justices with only one dissenting, stated that "The Russian
Federated soviet Republic is the existing de facto
government of Russia ...it is a matter of common
knowledge. ,,'09
The cable from Riga concerned this case and contained
a translation of an article from Izvestia"° which read:
The jUdgment of the Supreme Court in the Wulfson
[sic] Case confirms the jUdgment of the New York
Court which rejected Wulfson's [sic] suit against
the Soviet government; this jUdgment of the Supreme
Court constitutes an authoritative precedent for all
courts in the United States, and it recognizes the
Soviet Federation as a sovereign State which in
virtue of this fact cannot, without its consent, be
proceeded against in American courts. "'
'07Wulfsohnv. Russian Republic,
377, 138 N.E. 24 (1923). Also see:
Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns,"
38, 1924-1925, p. 620.
234 N.Y. 372, pp. 372-
Alfred Hayes, "Private
Harvard Law Review, Vol.
\08Wulfsohnv. Russian Republic, 234 N.Y., p . 373.
109 b i.dIl.,p.374.
110Izvestiawas the official soviet newspaper. Article
No. 237, October 16, 1924.
"'DSNA, Record Group 59, File 711.61/95, "Report No.
606," p. 2.
49
The article went on to quote New York attorney Charles
Recht, who had represented the defendant:
Regardless of the political position taken by the
Department of state, the jUdgment of the Supreme
Court constitutes a definite and authoritative legal
recognition of the sovereignty of the Soviet
Federation, in that it accords to the S.S.S.R. the
same rights as are enjoyed by all other sovereign
foreign states which, in the view of American law,
cannot be proceeded against without their consent in
American courts of law. 112
In the past, State Department officials had carefully
skirted the historical and legal issues surrounding the
entire recognition question and had elected to base their
arguments on emotional, economic, and political
considerations. Now, the American courts were forcing the
state Department to reevaluate this fixed, inflexible
approach: the legal issues would simply have to be
addressed. Quite naturally, the responsibility for this
analysis fell on the shoulders of the newly-proclaimed
Russian expert in the Division of Eastern European Affairs,
Robert Kelley.
Kelley's response to this compelling challenge was
historically significant for a number of reasons. First, it
laid bare the ambiguities of a foreign policy in which
politics triumphed over law and emotion conquered reason.
Second, it brought into focus the critical question of what
role self-interest -- whether of a nation, a department, or
an individual -- played in the formulation of foreign
112 • dLb i, ., p. 2 •
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policy. Finally, Kelley's approach was demonstrative of the
modus operandi with which he not only tackled this challenge
but would attack future problems. Here, the search has not
been for the facts of Kelley's life but rather for the
meaning of that life. Historians are widely agreed on the
importance of Kelley's role in formulating and sustaining
America's policy of nonrecognition. 113 The questions they
have not fUlly answered are why and how. In this chapter,
an attempt will be made to provide those answers by
analyzing Kelley as he faced the serious legal challenge to
the state Department's nonrecognition policy.
To understand the seriousness of this challenge, it
might be well to review the development of that policy
which, by 1924, had been in place for seven years.
As has already been shown, the Bolshevik Revolution
caught Washington by surprise. The bewildered state
Department was first stunned and then outraged by the
inflammatory social propositions emanating from the
Bolshevik leadership. Wounded, feeling itself to be a good
friend betrayed, the United states government retreated to a
moral high ground. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby
emphasized this position on August 10, 1920, in a note to
113S fl'ee or examp e: Donald G. BlShop The Roosevelt-. . ,Lltvlnov A?reements, pp. 12, 17; Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology
and Economlcs, pp. 38, 39 99 100; Williams Appleman
Williams, American Russia~ Relations 1781-1947, p. 209;
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 20-21.
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the Italian Ambassador at Washington, Baron Camillo
Avezzana:
It is not possible for the government of the
united states to recognize the present rulers of
Russia as a government with which the relations
common to friendly governments can be maintained.
This conviction has nothing to do with any
particular political or social structure which the
Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace.
It rests upon a wholly different set of facts.
These facts, which none dispute, have convinced the
Government of the united states, against its will,
that the existing regime in Russia is based upon the
negation of every principle of honor and good faith,
and every usage and convention, underlying the whole
structure of international law; the negation, in
short, of every principle upon which it is possible
to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether
of nations or individuals .... In the view of this
Government, there cannot be any common ground upon
which it can stand with a power whose conceptions of
international relations are so entirely alien to its
. 1 11.own, so utterly repugnant to ltS mora sense.
Colby's emotional argument would continue to be used in
official support of nonrecognition until 1933.
In spite of Colby's castigation of the Soviet
Government, it is worth mentioning that a month before this
note was sent, on July 8, 1920, the Department of State had
announced" the "removal of the restrictions which had stood
in the way of trade and communications with Soviet
'''FRUS,2:1920, Colby to Avezzana, August 10, 1920, pp.
463-468. For a history of Colby's note see: Ronald Radosh,
"John Spargo and Wilson's Russian Policy, 1920, The Journal
of American History, Vol. 52, 1965, pp. 548-565. Radosh
argues that John Spargo, who was closely associated with the
Russian Division of the State Department, wrote the first,
and nearly unchanged draft of the policy statement. Spargo
was in close contact with John A. Gade, who was briefly and
at that time, chief of the Department of Russian Affairs.
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Russia. ,,115 The department, while officially cooperating
with business interests, continued to emphasize that
"individuals or corporations availing themselves of the
opportunity to trade with Russia would do so on their own
responsibility and at their own risk. ,,11' The careful
historian, Joan Hoff Wilson, has convincingly argued that
"although business spokesmen did sometimes criticize the
policy of nonrecognition as irrelevant or shortsighted,
there is no evidence that organized business pressure
prompted recognition.,,117 The state Department's ambiguity
in allowing, and in some cases even facilitating, trade with
an unrecognized government helps to explain why there was no
groundswell of support for recognition from the American
business community. As Wilson points out, however, trading
with the communists caused a dilemma for more thoughtful
business leaders because, as long as the soviets refused "to
conform to U.s. standards of economics and politics,"
trading with them remained "ideologically unacceptable. ,,118
state Department officials, however, appeared to remain
unmoved by this ethical conflict.
"'Kelley to Secretary of State, October 29, 1926,
report attached, "The Policy of the united states towards
the Soviet Regime," p. 3. Kelley Papers, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
"'Ibid., p , 3.
117JoanHoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics, p. 112.
118 bidI .i, ., p. 110.
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The adroit diplomat, Charles Evans Hughes, who
replaced Colby as Secretary of State in 1921, advanced more
sophisticated economic and political arguments. On March
21, 1923, in an address before the delegation of the Women's
Committee for Recognition of Russia, he said, "...the
fundamental question in the recognition of a government is
whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge
international obligations . ...Of what avail is it to speak
of assurances," Hughes demanded, "if valid obligations and
rights are repudiated and property is confiscated?"'"
Hughes saved his most compelling political argument for the
end of his remarks. He began by quoting from a particularly
inflammatory speech given by Leon Trotsky the previous
October. "'That means, comrades, that revolution is coming
in Europe as well as in America, systematically, step by
step, stubbornly and with gnashing of teeth in both camps.
It will be long protracted, cruel, and sanguinary! '" --
Hughes softly concluded, "We want to help ...but the world we
desire is a world not threatened with the destructive
propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there
will be good faith and the recognition of obligations and a
119FRUS, 2:1923, March 21, 1923, pp. 756-757. For a
Russian historical perspective on these policies see:
Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, tr. Olga Alder
Titelbaum, Russia and the united States, pp. 75-118. Hughes
was characterized on September 26, 1924, by Soviet Commissar
Chicherin, as a man, "who express(es) the will of the big
bankers and trusts of America." Ibid., p. 80.
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sound basis of international intercourse. ,,120 This speech
was reprinted and copies were distributed to support the
state Department's position. The speech also marked a
subtle shift in policy, in that greater emphasis was placed
on Soviet propaganda as a reason for denying recognition to
the Communists.
In July 1923, Hughes again had an opportunity to
enunciate his views and to further solidify the state
Department's anti-communist stance. In a widely quoted
reply to Samuel Gompers, President of the A.F.L., Hughes
wrote in defense of the Department's position: "What is most
serious is that there is conclusive evidence that those in
control in Moscow have not given up their original purpose
of destroying existing governments wherever they can do so
throughout the world .... the sentiment of our people is not
deemed to be favorable to the acceptance into political
fellowship of this regime so long as it ...cherishes, as an
ultimate and definite aim, the destruction of the free
insti tutions which we have laboriously built up ....,,12'
Hughes's firm statements won broad public support within the
United states. Meanwhile, the Eastern European division
"was largely occupied in supporting the nonrecognition
120FRUS,2:1923, March 21,1923, p , 758.
12'FRUS,2:1923, July 9, 1923, pp. 763-764.
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policy of Mr. Hughes. ,,122 This hostile stance was bitterly
resented by the Soviets, and Russian historians have viewed
the period as a time when America "proceeded from the
assumption that in the postwar economic, political, and
moral world only the Americans could make demands while only
others were obligated to respond. ,,123
As indicated in Chapter I, Hughes had cooly rebuffed
the Soviet overture which followed President coolidge's
somewhat moderate address to Congress in December 1923. The
pro-recognitionists' bitter defeat at the hands of the
Eastern Europeanists during the recognition hearings had
further served to secure the State Department's hostile,
immoveable position. And if there were ambiguities in
allowing trade with a government whose existence was denied,
those ambiguities were ignored; if there were contradictions
in a policy which denied de facto recognition to a
government which had been in place for seven years, those
contradictions were disregarded; and if there was paradox in
an entire State Department division devising a stratagem to
prevent recognition rather than assisting to bring
recognition about, then the acknowledgement of that paradox
was suppressed. But now the legal question demanded an
122John C. White, official in Eastern European Division,
Oral History Collection, Columbia University, p. 69, cited
in Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, Russia and
the united States, p. 80, footnote No. 15, p. 278.
123 b' d11.., p . 82.
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answer. It was impossible to ignore, disregard or suppress.
An analysis of that demand and the method by which Kelley
arrived at an answer presents an ideal opportunity to
examine what in this paper is called liThe Kelley Approach. II
Kelley's approach to problem solving owed much to his
background. By birth he was ill-equipped to compete in the
aristocratic world of twentieth century American diplomacy,
which tended to be dominated by Anglophiles who were
Protestant, wealthy, cultured and suave. Kelley, on the
other hand, was Catholic, Irish, unpolished and poor. They
had been born in family mansions; Kelley had been raised in
a modest cottage. They were the sons of professionals,
business tycoons, large landowners and military commanders;
Kelley was the son of a respected hard-working janitor at
the local high school. They spent their youth at private
prep schools or studying abroad; Kelley spent his attending
pUblic schools. Their fathers donated money to create
college scholarships; Kelly was awarded one. 124
Nor was wealth the only determinant. Years of
exposure to high culture -- leather-bound books and European
124The material for this biographical sketch has been
gathered from many sources. Most helpful were Kelley's
papers, Georgetown university, Washington, D.C. and the
memoirs of his contemporaries (listed in bibliography).
Samples of his personal correspondence are available in The
John Wiley Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York; The
Samuel Harper Papers, University of Chicago, Illinois; and
the Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
For a discussion of the aristocratic attitudes of early
twentieth diplomats see: Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club;
Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind.
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music, imported china and hand-cut crystal, clever repartee
and serious conversation -- had provided these offspring of
the elite with the patina which separates ordinary men from
gentlemen. If indeed America had an aristocracy, it was
embodied in her early twentieth century diplomats. In that
snob-riddled company, Kelley was a misfit. In short, he was
the perfect antithesis of the ideal diplomat.
Kelley unlike other diplomats from middle class
families, either made no effort or was unable to remodel his
behavior after the prevailing aristocratic mode. He adopted
neither the tastes nor the manners of the refined patricians
of the diplomatic corps but remained a plebeian
nonconformist. He was a noisy baseball fan and an expert
poker player. Although he played tennis -- a sport of
gentlemen -- he did so without grace, preferring to smash
the ball across the net rather than return a smooth volley.
Physically, he had a wide face dominated by a big nose
and a high forehead. His hair was thinning, his neck thick.
He had the watchful eyes of an outsider and the thoughtful
countenance of a scholar. A society columnist once
described him, rather unkindly, as "not overly chatty,
plump, pleasant, subtle, (though he doesn I t look it). ,,125
Even in a starched white shirt he appeared rumpled, his coat
unbuttoned, his tie awry, his trousers wrinkled. He had the
125Helen Essary, Town and Country, February 1936, Kelley
Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, washington, D.C.
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damp look of a man plagued by a perpetual perspiration
problem. Above all, Kelley lacked that near essential
prerequisite of all diplomats -- the intangible, elusive
element of style.
Yet Kelley endured. His intellectual prowess easily
balanced his other deficiencies, for Kelley was indisputably
a great intellect. Born with innate intelligence, he had
honed that natural gift into a formidable mental machine.
Proud, stubborn, and pragmatic, he had learned to cloak
insecurity with arrogance, sensitivity with abruptness, and
he had replaced his lack of social patina with a hard
intellectual veneer which eventually earned him a position
close to the center of diplomatic power in America. It was
no small achievement and one which rendered eloquent
testimony to the opportunities inherent in a democratic
society. Understandably, it also inculcated in the achiever
the belief that the democratic system was the best in the
world. For such a person, any repudiation of that system
had to be viewed almost as a personal affront. Kelley's
upbringing and his personal, laudable achievements must
therefore be considered when examining his acrimonious views
towards the soviet Government. The communist philosophy
cast an anathema, after all, on his own accomplishments, and
the world-wide triumph of that philosophy might very well
have pulled him down from the tall, steep ladder he had so
fiercely and so painfully climbed.
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The path of Kelley's climb was foreshadowed from
childhood. "Robert never had to be urged to study," his
father recalled. "His home lessons while in grammar and
high schools here and at Harvard were his first concern. ,,126
His research skills had been refined while an undergraduate.
"On being given a sUbject," Kelley wrote, "the first thing
to do is to ascertain the sUbject scope and date of the
event. ,,127A flaw which would later surface in Kelley's
analyses for the state Department is hinted at in the
comment of one of his professors. "You might do more with
Italy ...[by also considering herJ ...military and diplomatic
history. ,,128During his diplomatic career, Kelley frequently
ignored pertinent evidence and concentrated on those facts
and events which tended to sustain his own preconceived
conclusions. During his college days, Kelley already showed
signs of being able to bend ethical concepts. He once
recopied, in his own handwriting and with only minimal
alterations, one of his own "A" papers for submission by a
126GeorgeAbala, Interview with Mr. & Mrs. James H.
Kelley, Washington Daily News, January 20, 1931, Kelley
Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
127RobertKelley, "Sources to be used in the Compilation
of a Bibliography of the Crimean War," History 25, Kelley




fellow student. '29 This same disregard for established rules
would reemerge in 1927, when Kelley recommended that foreign
policy decisions made by the state Department not be
committed to writing but rather delivered verbally.'~ By
the time Kelley graduated from Harvard, he had developed a
style of thought and writing which would be his personal
mark for the rest of his life.
Kelley had an organized and logical mind. Neither a
wordsmith nor a phrasemaker, his official writings were
distinguished by sleek, cold prose. He frowned at
adjectives and scowled at adverbs. This was in contrast to
his personal correspondence, which was remarkable for its
warm earthiness. He was fond of simple metaphorical word
play. Commenting on Coolidge's presidency, Kelley wrote
Samual Harper in March, 1925, "The new pilot has now taken
the wheel, or rather is directing the helmsman, and the ship
of state continues its course as charted out and will
continue."'~ In a letter to his close friend, the diplomat
John wiley, he wrote concerning Wiley's numerous reports on
the Bolsheviks' activities in Germany, "I hope that you will
129Robert Kelley, "Roman occupation of Spain," History
3.B., compare with, "The Romanization of Spain," Folder 1,
Box 1, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.
13°Robert Kelley, Memorandum, October 28, 1927, DSNA,
Record Group 59, File 861.51 AM 3; quoted in Joan Hoff
Wilson, Ideaology and Economics, p. 40.
'~Kelley to Harper, March la, 1925, Harper Papers,
University of Chicago, Illinois.
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not conclude that you have been feeding us too well, for as
you know, we are very fond of rich food. ,,'" Kelley often
commented on a political situation and ended with the
quizzical phrase, "What say yoU?,,'33But as Kelley prepared
to provide an answer to the legal questions which had been
raised by the American courts, the warmth disappeared and
his cold and logical mind dominated.
Although Kelley lacked formal training in law, he was
undoubtedly aware of the legal tenets of de facto
recognition. A letter in the Eastern European file clearly
outlined the legal and historical theories which the united
states government had accepted from the time of American
independence and could be summarized as follows:
1. Thomas Jefferson developed the de facto principle of
recognition. "He conceived recognition to be an
independent act depending not upon the whim of the
recognizing state but conditioned solely by the
governmental stability of the new organization ..."
2. "This de facto theory of recognition had been followed
by a long course of precedents in the united states
state Department."
3. "This doctrine had subsequently become the general
practice in Europe."
'''Kelleyto Wiley, January 30, 1930, Wiley papers, FDR
Library, Hyde Park, New York.
'33Kelley/Harper Correspondence 1925-1940, Harper
Papers, University of Chicago, Illinois.
62
4. "The real basis upon which any recognition is granted
is the existence of a de facto government, whether or
not it is founded upon any juristic basis."'"
If these arguments had been accepted, it would appear that
the soviet government should have been recognized, for any
other decision would have been inconsistent with the law
a law Americans proudly traced back to Thomas Jefferson.
The American courts now were forcing the state
Department to openly reevaluate the inconsistencies of its
anomalous position. Kelley did so in a paper dated December
17, 1924, entitled "The Case for the Recognition of the
soviet Government." The paper was eleven typed pages long
without corrections or notations. Its authorship was
clearly established by the heavy, unmistakable initials
"R.F.K."l35 stripped bare of emotion, the arguments
concentrated only on the legal, political and economic
evidence. The opening paragraph contained both a political
and a legal argument:
The recent celebration of the seventh anniversary of
the establishment of the soviet regime and the fact that
during the past year full recognition has been accorded
to the soviet government by nine European states,
including some of the most important, (thereby bringing
134FredericR. Kellogg to F. M. Dearing, Assistant
Secretary of State, May 20, 1921. DSNA, Record Group 59,
File 311.6154 C94/3., marked: "Ack. by DW Poole, 6/2/21."
Kellogg was an attorney associated with the New York law
firm of Kellogg, Emery and Cuthell.
135RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
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the total of European states that have granted
recognition to sixteen out of twenty-five), would seem
to have cleared the way for the recognition of the
Soviet government by the united States. ...It can
hardly be denied that the Soviet government has
succeeded in maintaining itself against all adverse
claimants and that it is in possession of the machinery
of state and administering government without
substantial resistance to its authority. Neither can it
be gainsaid that it is in a position to fulfill all the
international obligations and responsibilities incumbent
upon a foreign state under treaties and international
law. Such being the case, it would appear that, in view
of the significance of the act of recognition in
international practice, the Soviet government deserves,
in fact, recognition by this government. 136
Kelley expanded the legal argument by explaining that
recognition did not affirm approval of a form of government
but merely admitted, "that this government really exists and
is capable of entering into international obligations. In
the long run, he reasoned, "it is not the constitutionality
of a government which makes it legitimate, but its effective
power -- its stability ..." He argued that in the past the
United States government had only been concerned with the
"stability" of a foreign government and not with "its
qualities or methods." Any "deviations from this sound
international practice," he wrote, "have generally been
attended with unwelcome complications and disagreeable
consequences. n 137
The legal and economic ramifications of nonrecognition
were then examined. "The difficulties," Kelley wrote,
136Ibid., pp , 1-2.
137Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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"...wherein the de facto conditions are ignored by the
political authorities, are made manifest in the decisions of
the judicial authorities. ,,138 The courts, Kelley argued, had
been forced "to accord to an unrecognized de facto
government, ...the attributes of a recognized government. ,,13'
Three cases were cited in support of Kelley's argument: the
Wulfsohn case, Luther v. Sagor and Company, and Sokolov v.
National City Bank.
The wulfsohn case concerned the seizure of furs which
the plaintiff [Wulfsohn] had stored in Russia and which were
alleged to have been confiscated by the soviet government.
The New York Supreme Court, Kelley wrote, "had accorded to
the unrecognized soviet government, the rights of a
government ...recognized de jure in that it held that the
soviet government cannot, without its consent be proceeded
against in an American court. ,,140 Judge Andrews had written:
[Our courts] may not bring a foreign sovereign
before our bar ...because he has not submitted
himself to our laws. without his consent he is not
subject to them. Such is not the proper method of
redress if a citizen of the united states is
wronged. The question is a political one, not
confided to the courts but to another department of
government. Whenever an act done by a sovereign in
13'Ibid.r p. 5.
13'Ibid., p. 5.
140Ibid. , p. 5.
65
his sovereign character is questioned it becomes a
matter of negotiation or of reprisals or of war.'"
The case of Luther v. Sagor and Company which was
argued in November and December 1920, was cited by Kelley as
his second example. He cited this case to illustrate "the
injurious effect, on private rights and on the security of
commercial transactions [which resulted from] the policy of
nonrecognition. ",.2 It is somewhat strange that Kelley cited
this case at all as it was argued before the King's Bench in
England. The case is a lengthy one which concerns the
confiscation of a private sawmill in Russia and touches on
questions of international law, jurisdiction, the statues of
the Russian Soviet Republic, Recognition of sovereignty and
Confiscatory degrees. On the point of recognition, the
court held, "that if a foreign government or its sovereignty
is not recognized by His Majesty's Government the courts of
this country will not recognize such foreign government or
its sovereignty. ,,'43 The point Kelley was making, of course,
was, that this ruling left business interests which had
legitimate claims against the Soviet government without
redress.
'41Wulfsohnv. Russian Republic, January 1923, 234 N.Y. ,
pp. 372-373.
'''RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 5, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
'''A.M. Luther v. James Sagor and Company, November 29,
1920 - December 8, 1921, Common Law Reports, K. B. 1921, pp.
456, 474. Cited quote can be found on page 456.
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The third example Kelley mentioned was the case of
Sokolov v. National City Bank. He wrote, "The jUdge pointed
out the necessity of passing beyond the legal fiction
created by a policy of non recognition and establishing the
actual situation in Russia. ,,144This case concerned deposits
made by the plaintiff, Sokoloff, into the Petrograd Branch
of The National city Bank of New York. Judge J. Cardozo in
a majority opinion found for the defendant, Sokolov. In his
decision Judge Cardozo wrote:
Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may
be viewed as no government at all, if the power
withholding recognition chooses thus to view it. In
practice, however, since juridical conceptions are
seldom, if ever carried to the limit of their logic,
the equivalence is not absolute, but is subject to
self-imposed limitations of common sense and
fairness ...foreign governments which, though
formally unrecognized have notoriously an existence
as governments de facto. 145
The implications of these jUdgments are worth
attention. The courts had been forced to view the Soviet
government as the de facto government of Russia.
Historically the united States government had based its
decision to recognize a new government upon "de facto
conditions and not upon any de jure or legitimacy theory. ,,146
144RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 5, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
145Sokoloffv. National City Bank, November 1924, 239 N.
Y. 158, 158-171, p. 165.
14'Kelloggto Dearing, May 20, 1921, p. 3. DSNA, Record
Group 59, File 311.6154 C94/3.
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The logical conclusion was that the united states had
recognized soviet Russia, or at least that one branch of
government had.
As Kelley pointed out, America's international trade
was also often adversely affected by these legal decisions.
In a particularly cutting comment in the November 1924 issue
of Harvard Law Review, Alfred Hayes wrote:
It is amazing that at a time when there is a
persistent effort to have pUblic international
controversies determined jUdicially, the pecuniary
claims of private litigants are left to the
expensive, dilatory, and inefficient action of
diplomatic officers. The courts have the necessary
machinery for securing and sifting evidence and
disposing of such claims on their merits. In the
field of diplomacy the merits become involved with
political considerations. '"
Kelley was aware of these implications. These decisions,
"rising out of the necessity of the jUdicial authorities to
face realities," he wrote, "reveal the confused situation
created through the misapprehension of the real nature of
the act of recognition in international law."'·
'''AldredHayes , "Private Claims Against Foreign
Sovereigns," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 38, 1924-1925, p. 621.
'·Robert Kelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, pp. 5-6, Kelley
Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. For
related cases also see: Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibraio, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923);
James and Company v. The Second Russian Insurance Company,
208 App. Div. 141, 205 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1924). While
neither of these cases are cited in Kelley's paper, they
also concerned the legal problems inherent in the
nonrecognition policy.
68
Kelley then presented the economic argument. He
called the absence of recognition "a stumbling block" to
business interests. "As long as normal relations do not
exist, trade will tend to fall into the hands of speculators
and non reputable business concerns. ,,149
Finally, he listed the political arguments: disputes
between the united states and Russia could "best be
settled," the Bolsheviks would be "deprived of the
argument ...that they are severely handicapped in the sphere
of economic construction by the hostility of foreign
governments," and recognition would "permit freer exchange
of information" which would be beneficial to both sides. ,,'50
Finally, Kelley concluded:
It must not be forgotten that recognition will
tend to encourage the people of Russia to
realize that the responsibility for future
development in Russia rests upon them alone and
that foreign states have definitely abandoned
any intention of imposing their will upon
them. 15'
This curious document, which was clearly authored by
Kelley -- a man who personally did not favor recognition of
the soviet government -- raises a number of questions. Why
was it written, by whom was it ordered, and most
importantly, why were the forceful arguments outlined in the
'49Robert Kelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 6., Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
'50Ib id., p. 7.
15'Ibid.,p. 11.
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document, rejected? In the absence of indisputable
supporting evidence, it can most likely be concluded that
the legal arguments raised by the position of America's
courts forced a reevaluation of the state Department's
policy. Kelley's emphasis on those arguments tends to
support this thesis. 152 There had also been some discussion
of a change in policy during the latter months of 1924.'~
There seems little doubt that the document was written at
the request of Secretary of state Hughes, who like Kelley
was staunchly anti-Bolshevik, but who in this instance, was
driven to response by outside pressures. The broader
question of why these arguments were rejected is more
difficult to answer, yet for historians, it remains the key
question in the center of the storm. A simplified answer is
that the United states could maintain greater leverage by
not recognizing the Soviet government.
Leverage of course, could be supplied by either
recognition or nonrecognition: it was a choice between the
152For a different analysis see: Frederic Propas, liThe
State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and Soviet-American
Relations 1918-1938," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1982), p. 36. Propas writes,
"...Kelley's memo was an exercise setting forth the case for
the other side and anticipating rising opposition to the
policy of nonrecognition. II This is speculation which is
unsupported by the content of the paper. Moreover, this
reason is highly unlikely judged by Kelley's consistent
approach to problem solving. Propas' hesitancy is evident
from his later comment. "...it is worthwhile to examine
other explanations of this memo." Ibid., p. 36.
''''WilliamsAppleman Williams, American Russian
Relations 1781 1947, p. 207.
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carrot or the stick, but nonrecognition had the added
advantage of always being reversible. Whether or not the
soviet government could have been won over by friendship
remains a matter of speculation because the United states
did not test it. Both pride and fear may have played a part
in the state Department's policy. The leadership was
arrogantly disinclined to follow Europe's lead and recognize
the soviets or to forget old betrayals. There were some
state Department officials who sincerely feared that the
communist propaganda carried the seeds of potential world
revolution. However, the single element which carried the
greatest weight in explaining the reason nonrecognition
remained the "policy of choice" was an economic one.
Despite the American public's desire for the adoption
of a policy of isolationism, the leaders realized that the
united states had become the greatest creditor nation in the
world and that commercial intercourse was a necessity if the
capitalistic pattern of life was to continue. Not only were
outside markets necessary, but there must be one single
international standard to settle debts and arrange credit.
The expanding Russian market, however attractive, was not
the primary factor. What was needed was a set of rules
which would guarantee global economic conformity. The
disruption of trade and repudiation of debts were simply
intolerable to American statesmen. America's prosperity
depended on expanding trade. The communist anti-
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capitalistic philosophy and their unwillingness to accept
America's rules was a disturbing influence on the
continuation of American's affluence.
It is evident from Kelley's evaluation that he and the
state Department were aware of the legal and historical
rightness of recognizing the Soviet government. Obviously,
they chose to ignore these arguments. Emotional, economic,
and political concerns won the battle with legal and
rational considerations. For Kelley, the document is
illustrative of his strength of mind and his pragmatic
nature, for never in his long career was he comfortable with
the communists or the Soviet government. Furthermore, the
Eastern European Division, made up of hand picked anti-
communist researchers, was dedicated to uncovering the
menace of communism and any shift in policy might well have
terminated that department.
Once again, the anti-recognitionists had triumphed,
this time by simply burying the legal and historical issues.
In the future the propaganda issue would be the rationale
used to fuel the popular fear of the Soviets and thus keep
the preferred policy in place.
As for Kelley, in 1925 at age thirty-one, he would be
named the youngest chief ever of a geographical division of
the State Department. From that position he would be able
to chart the direction of Russian-American relations.
Equally as important, he would be able to establish a
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program to train America's future sovietologists -- a
younger generation of Russian experts -- whom the unmarried,
childless Kelley affectionately called, "my boys" and to




At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution there was
little debate among state Department officials on the
probable durability of the communist experiment. They
expected it to fail. This jUdgment, persisted even after
the Russian civil War further entrenched the communist
political leaders and continued following the New Economic
Policy (NEP) which redirected and stabilized Russia's
economy. Most state Department officials interpreted the
political entrenchment as temporary and the economic reforms
as a swing towards capitalism. Holding these views,
America's political elite deemed it irrelevant to study the
language or history of Russia or to understand Bolshevism,
whose radical concept of world order they detested as
inimical to Western civilization and an affront to America's
heritage and traditions which they proudly traced back to
the Greeks.
Robert Kelley deduced a different meaning from these
events. He believed that the communist ideology posed a
present and possibly permanent threat to democracy and to
America's cherished ideals. Recognizing the importance of
American-Russian relations, he urged the state Department to
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allow him to initiate a program to instruct young foreign
service officers in Russian language and history. "I was
convinced of the need for a group of officials in the
Department of state who understood and spoke Russian,"
Kelley recalled:
I had the feeling that to learn the language is
not sUfficient, because language was an
expression of the people of the country. So if
you really wanted to know the language you had
to know about the country. And that meant
knowing thoroughly the history of Russia,
including the background of the Bolsheviks.'~
Supported by Secretary of State Hughes, Kelley's proposal
was accepted, funds were allocated, and the training of
America's future Soviet experts began.
The young students, hand-picked by Kelley from the
ranks of the newly-accepted foreign service officers,
studied for four years under Kelley's direction and
tutelage. The views the bUdding diplomats absorbed during
their formative days had a far-reaching effect on future
American-Soviet relations, for following recognition in
1933, many of these young men staffed America's embassy in
Moscow and two of them later served as America's ambassadors
to Russia.
Whether these views had a negative influence on the
development of a more harmonious relationship between the
two countries is the sUbject of some controversy among
164.
154Robert Kelley, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, p.
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historians. There is, however, no argument on the question
of the importance of Kelley's role and influence in the
training of America's future Sovietologists. A point less
understood is how Kelley -- however strong his personal
convictions, however stern his discipline -- was able to
fashion these bright, well-educated young men into a
dedicated group of anti-communists. The evidence will show
that Kelley's program actually discouraged the study of
sovietism or communist ideology. Instead, Kelley encouraged
the future diplomats not to hate the Russian Present, but
rather to value Russia's Past. That the students became as
anti-communist as Kelley was a natural, predicable, result.
Years before, Kelley too had been lured into emotional and
intellectual captivity by the literature, the history, and
the language of Old Russia. As Kelley had hoped, the
American students came to think and feel like pre-
revolutionary Russian aristocrats. They, too, came to
believe that the communist philosophy threatened not only
the destruction of their native American home but had
already violated their spiritual home, Old Russia.
This chapter will examine Kelley's Russian
specialization program and will analyze the effect of that
program on America's future Russian experts. In addition,
it will show the influence Kelley had, not only on his
"boys," but on all the foreign service trainees at that
time, by his participation in the Foreign Service School.
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Finally, it will discuss the possible ramifications of that
influence.
After gaining approval and funding for the Eastern
European language and area specialization program, Kelley
searched for schools which could provide the type of
academic training he envisioned. At that time there were
few universities in the united states which offered any
courses in Russian studies and only a handful of American
Russian scholars. Samuel Harper was teaching at the
University of Chicago; Kelley's former teacher, Bruce
Hopper, was still at Harvard; A.C. Coolidge was at Columbia;
and Malbone Graham and Robert Kerner were instructors at the
University of California. is However, these professors were
isolated from one another and the programs they offered were
not as advanced as those available in Europe. Kelley
therefore ruled out American universities.
Great Britain had several universities with
departments of Slavonic Studies -- the best known at the
University of London under the direction of Sir Bernard
Pares. te Kelley felt Pares underestimated the dangers
'''Frederic Propas, "The State Department, Bureaucratic
Politics and Soviet-American Relations 1918-1928," (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982),
p. 108; for information on Harper's classes, see: Samuel
Harper, The Russia I Believe In, pp. 52, 136-137, 156.
'''Forbiographical information on Pares, see Ibid., pp.
37-38. Also see: Harper-Pares Correspondence, 1906-1942,
Harper's Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.; Names
of instructors and courses offered at the University of
London can be found listed in Slavonic Review, 1926-1927.
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inherent in the communist ideology and was an apologist for
the Bolsheviks. For this reason, Kelley was disinclined to
expose America's future Russian experts to Pares'
instruction.'"
Several other programs were available in Europe, and
in December 1927, Kelley asked American consular officers
stationed in Prague, Berlin, and Paris to report on the
Russian academic programs offered in those cities. There
were numerous institutes in Prague which had been
established by Russian emigrees. Many of these instructors
had been exiled in 1921 and viewed the communist experiment
with a certain -- and to Kelley, dangerous -- ambivalence.'5'
Kelley felt uneasy about exposing his impressionable
students to the Russian emigrees. Furthermore, it was
doubtful that most of the candidates would have been
proficient enough in the Czech or Russian languages to
benefit from the programs. Nor were Germany's universities
chosen, probably because of the students' lack of German
language proficiency. 159
15'Frederic Propas, "The State Department,
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
1982), p , 109.
".,
Los Angeles,
15'Ibid.,p , 106. Harper claimed that there was a
"difference in psychology between the [Russian] emigrant
[1918] and the exile [1921]." Also see: Samuel Harper, The
Russia I Believe In, p. 155.
159Frederic Propas, "The state Department, . r





Kelley eventually selected the Langue orientale
Vivante in Paris, which was under the direction of Paul
Boyer. 160 This choice was not surprising given the fact that
both Kelley and his friend Samuel Harper had studied under
Boyer. Undoubtedly the final decision was based more on
ideological than academic considerations, for as Kelley
recalled, "I was fortunate in Paris; the head of the Langue
orientale Vivante, Boyer, sympathized with us and promised
assistance and went out of his way to accomplish what I had
in mind. 11161
with the location decided, the next step was to
determine the structure of the four-year program. First,
the students were assigned for approximately eighteen months
to an American embassy or legation in Eastern Europe: in
most cases the Baltic states or Prague. "The idea of
sending us to the area first was to make sure that we could
cope with the local liquor and local girls, ,,'6'recalled
George Kennan, who was one of the first two candidates
chosen.
The Baltic states at that time were miniatures of old
Tsarist Russia and had been part of the Russian Empire until
'60LongTimers, p. 164; also see: Harper-Boyer
Correspondence 1904-1939, Harper Papers, University of
Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
'6'RobertKelley, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers.
'6'GeorgeKennan, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, pp.
164-166.
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the Bolshevik Revolution. In his Memoirs, Kennan described
Riga, Latvia, where he was sent, as "a minor edition of st.
Petersburg . . one of those cases where the copy had
survived the original. ,,'63The legation was staffed by
Russians from the old American embassy at st. Petersburg. A
flood of Russian emigrees had escaped to Riga, and
everywhere there was a sense of sadness, a mixture of
despair, nostalgia, and sentimentality, masked by a
translucent gaiety. '6' An ethereal mood of yearning for the
past haunted the city. Riga in the 1920's and early 1930's
was the perfect place for young American students to gain an
appreciation of Old Russia. Conversely, it provided an
ideal atmosphere in which to learn to dislike the New Russia
and to distrust her communist overseers.
Another candidate chosen by Kelley was the affable
Charles Bohlen, who was assigned to Tallinn, Estonia for two
summers. He rented rooms from two sisters who had emigrated
from Leningrad .•65 Bohlen wrote in his memoirs that they
"undoubtedly followed the centuries-old style of the leisure
'63GeorgeKennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 29.
'64Ib;d. , 28 30~ p. - .
'65CharlesE. Bohlen, witness to History 1929-1969, p.
10. Note: Different names were used to identify the same
city by Kennan and Bohlen. The city was known as st.
Petersburg (1703-1914) but after Russia declared war on
Germany in 1914 Emperor Nicholas II changed the German name
to Petrograd. After Lenin's death in 1924, the city was
renamed Leningrad in his honor.
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class of czarist Russia.,,1°O The sisters were "strongly
anti-Bolshevik," Bohlen wrote, "and lived in the hope that
someday the nightmare would pass away and they would return
to Old Russia, complete with Czar and aristocracy." 167 Even
if the future officers were not assigned to the Baltic
states during their probationary period, they often were
sent there during the summer breaks in order to improve
their language skills, to assist with the diplomatic work at
the legation, and for exposure to the local culture. On
other occasions, they returned to Washington, D. C. and
worked in the Eastern European Division under an exacting
taskmaster, Kelley.
After successfully completing the probationary period,
the students were sent to Paris to study Russian language,
literature, and history. At the Ecole Nationale des Langues
Orientales Vivantes, the students' first area of
concentration was the Russian language. Boyer conducted
these classes, Bohlen recorded, "with brilliance and a
sardonic wit. Possessed of an esprit gaulois, he gave a
slightly indecent twist to many Russian expressions. "'68 In
addition, the students were taught Russian history, customs,
geography, and economics. Almost all the required readings
166bi dI 1 ., p. 10.
167bidI 1 ., p. 1l.
168 b idI 1 ., p , 10
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were from "anti-communist" books. 169 Another of Kelley's
students, Norris B. Chipman, criticized the second year of
the Paris program for spending too much time on the
translating of old Russian texts. 170 B. Eric Kuniholm, in a
later review of the school's curricUlum, gave high praise to
the first year's instruction but felt the last two years
should have concentrated more on soviet sUbjects. 171
Because he was fluent in German, Kennan was the only
student granted permission to study at the University of
Berlin's Seminar fur Orientalische spz-acherr.?" He recorded
that his studies stressed "basic linguistics, literary and
historical studies, not , 1 ,173. sov i et.o ogy.' At one time,
Kennan wrote Kelley and requested permission to enroll in
classes on contemporary Soviet subjects. Kelley refused:
"No, I don't want you to take those courses. I want you to
get the equivalent grounding in Russian history and
literature and language as a Russian who had finished one of
the Czarist universities before the Revolution would have
169 bid 0I~.,p.1.
170Frederic Propas, "The State Department. .," (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982),
p. 117-118.
17'Ibid.,p. 123.
172In the 1880's Bismark
educate German's diplomats.
Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 31.
had founded this school to
Ibid., p. 123; George Kennan,
173 b'dI~,p.33.
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had. And all this about the soviet Union can come later.,,174
Kennan, recalling Kelley's instructions, said, "This was the
best advice ever given to me, and it shows with what
enlightenment and wisdom this language training was run at
that time by Bob Kelley. ,,175
A bond close to kinship had developed between Kelley
and these young men. He was their mentor; they were his
students. He guided them; they respected him. He advised
them; they listened to him. In time, he came to love them;
in time, with their achievements and in their memoirs, they
honored him. They were the sons he might have had and for
their accomplishments he felt the blush of a father's pride.
In an emotional moment at the colloquy held in Miami in 1975
only one year before his own death, Kelley asked those
assembled to remember "his boys" whom he had trained forty-
five years earlier:
May I bring up a subject which I think ought to be
mentioned? It's a matter that, when I think of it,
I almost start weeping. And that is of the fourteen
Russian-language specialists whom we trained and
developed--all are dead except George Kennan
thought we ought to bring this up in memory.
. I
176
Kelley's softer side of sentimentality was usually
hidden, however, and he was better known in the department
174George Kennan, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, p.
167.
'''Ibid., p. 167.
'''RobertKelley recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, p.
23.
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for the erudite scholarship he expected and the exacting
discipline he demanded from both his students and those he
supervised. His reputation was not undeserved. A letter
Wiley wrote to Kelley in 1932 illustrates this point:
Flack and Armstrong were in a state of acute
melancholy as a result of the last informal
comments from your division. You certainly tore
the pants off of them. I persuaded them,
however, not to do the swan-dive of despair into
the Vistula. .. They have both been working
very hard . . . and, as they both have been
really extremely industrious and eager to
please, I think it would not be a bad idea to
find a pretext to give them a little pat on the
back. 177
Kelley was pleased with the results of the program.
"I think the program turned out very successfully .
[and] was absolutely indispensable to the development of our
relations with the soviet Union in those early years,"
Kelley later recalled. "Some of these officers spoke as
well as any Russian. ,,178
In addition to the four-year formal academic program,
Kelley established a program to train other Eastern European
specialists at the United States legation at Riga. These
officers transferred often between Riga and the Eastern
European Division in Washington, D.C. Loy W. Henderson, who
played a major role in Soviet-American relations in the
1930's, became a Russian specialist in this way. His
177John Wiley to Robert Kelley, May 23, 1932, John Wiley
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
178RobertKelley recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, pp.
164-165.
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devotion to Kelley was life-long, and it was Henderson's sad
task to write Kelley's obituary for the washington Post in
June 1976.179
As can be seen, Kelley forecasted accurately America's
need for foreign service officers who spoke fluent Russian.
He was able to establish the Russian cultural studies
program he envisioned, and the success of that program was
testified to by his students and fellow officers. Charles
(Chip) Bohlen and George Kennan, the only students to write
published memoirs, were loud in their praise of the program.
Even Russia's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov,
said that, "Mr. Kelley's young men were in many ways better-
trained in Russian history than anyone in the soviet
diplomatic service. ,,180
The program was not without some detractors. In a
discussion of which diplomats should be sent to Moscow
following recognition, one newspaper columnist wrote:
179Loy Henderson, "Robert Kelley Dies, Expert on Russia
for state Dept.," The Washington Post, June 3, 1976.
Henderson was assigned to "EE," 1925-1926, 1930-33, Riga,
1927-1929, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 1934-1938, Counsellor of
Embassy, Moscow, 1942. Henderson's six-volume memoirs are
as yet unpublished but have been made available to many
historians.
180JamesReston, "Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy
Retires, " New York Times, photocopy of article in Kelley
Papers, Box 9, Folder 9, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C. Date of article unknown. Hand-written note reads,
"Bob-Just want to make sure you see this." signed, "sw"
Reston also writes that "Mr. Kelley was a taciturn
disciplinarian . "
85
The state Department's career boys are arguing
about the type of diplomat that should be sent to
assist Ambassador Bullitt in Russia. The bespatted
Personnel Board wants to send men trained in the
neighboring countries of Latvia, Estonia, Poland .
It claims these men know Russia . Others
claim that these men stationed in these neighboring
countries have been trained under the Old Deal to
hate Russia ter
The question of which other foreign officers could have been
sent was not addressed by the columnist. Indeed, it would
have been difficult at that time to have found anyone in the
service who had not been influenced by Kelley's anti-
communist bias.
A more puzzling criticism, and one which raises some
question of Kennan's veracity, was made in a personal letter
Kennan wrote to John Wiley on November 3, 1938:
. . I think a real effort should be made to get away
from the feeling, that the function of the Russian
section is to give the department ammunition with which
to protect itself against attacks from irate Congressmen
and pro-Soviet elements in the country. This was the
atmosphere under which Kelley's division functioned for
a good ten years, and some of us have not yet been able
to eradicate it entirely from our minds. '82
This sharp comment was made in the context of whether or not
to continue the anti-communist analysis performed at Riga, a
function which had been an intrinsic part of Kelley's
training program. Kennan's remark becomes more intelligible
if one considers that the Eastern European Division had been
18'DrewPearson, "Merry-Go-Around," The Daily
Washington, January 13, 1934, Kelley Papers, scrapbook,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
'''GeorgeKennan to John Wiley, November 3, 1938, Wiley
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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abruptly dissolved in 1937 and the Russian desk assigned to
the supervision of the Western European Division. Kennan
occupied that desk for one unhappy year, during which time
he charged that the "Western European Division, obviously,
was serious in its determination 'not to take Russia too
seriously. ,,,183 SUbsequently, Kennan was critical of the
shabby treatment Kelley and "EE" had received. At the time
however, 1937-1938, he, too, appears to have been
disillusioned with certain aspects of Kelley's program.
In addition to the language training program, Kelley
was actively involved with the Foreign Service School
authorized by the Rogers Act of May 3, 1924. The school was
responsible for instructing new foreign service recruits in
the art of diplomacy. The term of instruction was one year,
and anyone failing to meet the required standards was
dismissed at the end of this probationary period. It was
hoped that the "common training of the students" would
eliminate rivalry between the diplomatic and consular
branches of the service, build morale, and provide the
students with the fundamentals of diplomacy. '"
lUGeorge Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp. 85-86.
'''Forinformation on the Foreign Service School, see:
Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind,
Chapter V, pp. 172-211; Ellery C. Stowell, "The Foreign
Service School," The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 19, October 1925, pp. 763-768; For a discussion of the
Rogers Act, see: Ellery C. Stowell, "Reforms in the State
Department and Foreign Service," The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 22, July, 1928; pp. 606-610. For
the impressions of two students who attended the school,
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Joseph Grew, Undersecretary of state and one of the
driving forces behind the school, welcomed one of the
classes. "I think one of the finest things in the service
is the building up of the great esprit de corps, the great
solidarity of the ranks, close contact between men in the
Department with men in the field."'·' While this attitude
encouraged the young diplomats to think of themselves as a
special professional class, conversely it discouraged
independent thought or behavior.
The training was divided into two categories. The
first area was concerned with practical matters:
extradition, passport laws, visas, use of English in
diplomatic correspondence. The second area dealt with
foreign policy analysis. These lectures were delivered by
experts from the Department of state. In the case of
American-Russian relations and related subjects, all the
lectures were prepared and delivered by officials from the
Eastern European Division. Between April 20, 1925, and
January 15, 1927, thirteen lectures were delivered by these
Russian experts. Evan Young, then chief of the Eastern
European Division, delivered a lecture entitled "Russia" on
see: Charles E. Bohlen, witness to History, p. 6, George
Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp. 19-20.
18'JosephGrew, Undersecretary of State, speech
delivered to new students, November 2, 1925, lectures to the
Foreign Service School, 1925-1930, 7 Vols., State Department
File 623, Record Group 59, National Archives of the united
states. (Hereafter cited FSS)
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June 24, 1925.'88 Preston Kumler, who was assigned to "EE"
and responsible for gathering information on communist
activities in the united states, spoke on "Activities of the
soviet Regime in the united states" on January 6, 1926.'87
Earl L. Packer, assistant chief of "EE", delivered his
lecture, "The Russian Revolution of 1917, ,,188on December 22,
1925. The remaining ten lectures were all prepared and
delivered by Kelley. The topics ranged from "The Baltic
states and Russia" (June 19, 1925)'· to "Essential Factors
Involved in Establishing Normal Relations with the soviet
Union" (January 7, 1926) ,'90
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze
Kelley's lectures individually, an effort will be made to
isolate and analyze the common themes. Kelley's lectures
may be divided into three broad categories: 1) history of
Russia, the Baltic states, and Poland; 2) foreign and
188EvanYoung, "Russia," June 24, 1925, FSS.
187PrestonKumler, "Activities of the




188EarlPacker, "The Russian Revolution of 1917,"
December 22, 1925, FSS. Packer made the interesting point
that "the Allied intervention" was "instrumental in
assisting the Bolsheviks to consolidate their hold [by
appealing] to Russian nationalism and patriotism." p. 15.
189RobertKelley, "The Baltic states and Russia," June
19,1925, FSS.
190RobertKelley, "Essential Factors Involved in the
Establishment of Normal Relations with the soviet Regime,"
January 7, 1926, FSS.
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domestic policies of the Soviet Union; 3) the position of
the united States vis-a-vis the Soviet government.
In the history category, he delivered four lectures,
three of which traced the dismemberment of the Russian
Empire following the Bolshevik Revolution and the World War.
"Five new independent entities -- Finland, Esthonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland -- [were] all created out of territory
of [the] former Russia Empire. ,,191Kelley stressed in these
lectures that the new, struggling states felt threatened by
"their common danger from the East. ,,192While there was not
"a formal military alliance among these states," he said,
there existed a "moral union," and in case of attack from
the East, "in that moment of danger all will act conjointly
. even in the absence of written treaties. ,,193The theme
of these lectures was that the newly-established states
distrusted and feared the Bolsheviks and for valid reasons.
Kelley's judgments were very subtle yet are implicit in his
choice of words, e.g. "During 1922, the Bolsheviks
suppressed the uprising with great severi t.y ;."!" "The
Russian efforts to crush Lithuanian. .,11 "persecution
191RobertKelley, "The Baltic States and Russia," June
19, 1925, p. 1, FSS.
192RobertKelley, "Baltic States [II] (continued),"
December 19, 1925, p. 16, FSS.
193Ibid.,p. 16.
194RobertKelley, "Baltic States [I]," December 18,
1925, p. 7, FSS.
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directed against . .Catholics," and "Polish religion
persecuted. ,,195 He did not explicitly state his personal
opinions. His research was far-reaching and impressive, his
organization flawless in its logic, his message understated
yet clear.
The final lecture in the history series was entitled
an "Outline of Russian History, ,,196 in which he analyzed the
evolution of the Russian state. He argued that,
historically, "the fate of Russia was largely determined by
its geographical position, ,,'97 that there was "a complete
absence of natural frontiers, seas, or mountains," with the
result that, "constant military preparedness was the sine
qua non of the very existence of such a state. ,,19' The
Bolshevik Revolution was successful, Kelley argued, because,
"the Russian state and social organization had become an
anachronism, ,,199 which was unable to meet the challenges
presented by the modernization of other world powers,
particularly in "the carrying on of successful war."- This
was a thoughtful lecture, very much as one might expect from
195Ibid. , p. 14.
19'RobertKelley,
21, 1925, FSS.
197Ibid. I p. 2.
19'Ibid., p. l.
199Ibid. , p. 19.
2ooIbid. , p. 19.
"Outline of Russian History," December
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a historian. Only in the closing paragraph is Kelley's bias
revealed:
Although . we have a tremendous expansion and
growth of the external power and prestige of the
Russian state, there was no progress in the internal
political, economic or cultural development of the
Russian people, and it was this internal
backwardness of the Russian people that explains the
rapidity and extent of the debacle of 1917.~1
It is of some interest that the thesis Kelley advanced
in explanation of Russia's belligerence and hostility
towards her neighbors foreshadowed Kennan's "X-Article.,,202
This article was the cause of fierce debate at the time, and
remained the sUbject of historical inquiry for years. Both
Kelley's lecture and Kennan's essay argued that throughout
her history, Russia had lacked secure borders, had been
surrounded by enemies, and had suffered the constant threat
of invasion or intervention. The result had been that "all
the resources of the country had been placed at the disposal
of the national defense,,203so as to impress any adversaries
with Russia's military strength.~4 The scholarly Kennan may
2°'Ibid.,p. 19.
202GeorgeKennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"
Foreign Affairs, 25: 1946-47, pp. 566-582.
203RobertKelley, "Outline of Russian History," December
21, 1925, p. 1, FSS.
2~This was a familiar thesis of Kennan's. See: "The
united States and Russia," written Winter 1946, reprinted
ANNEX, Memoirs, pp. 560-565. "The Russians, throughout
their history, have dealt principally with fierce hostile




well have arrived at these conclusions through his own
studies, and here the point is merely to suggest the
possibility of Kelley's influence on the future reasoning of
diplomats who were exposed to his sagacious observations.
In the second category, governmental policies, Kelley
delivered seven lectures. He analyzed the Soviet leaders as
"disciples of Marx" for whom the "question of boundaries is
always of minor importance," and therefore, he stated,
"slogans of self-determination" were used by the leadership
"purely as a tactical movement. ,,205He explained the
communist doctrine of class struggle and claimed that the
union of legislative, jUdicial, and executive power resided
in a body of twenty-one men, and further claimed that the
object of that doctrine was "to insure dictatorship of those
in power.,,206 Kelley cautioned students that it would be "a
grievous mistake to conclude" that this government is "a
sovereign political body deriving its authority from the
sovereignty of the people. ,,207The political organs merely
legalized the "activities of the real governing power -- the
Russian Communist Party. ,,208
205RobertKelley, "soviet Union," June 22, 1925, p. 2,
FSS.
206Ibid.,p , 2.
207RobertKelley, "Territorial and Political




The development of the Russian Communist Party and the
Third International was the subject of another lecture. The
presentation on the Third International was a particularly
impressive piece of scholarship. Kelley made his points by
quoting extensively from the speeches and writings of
communist leaders and allowed his students to reach their
own conclusions. In his final remarks, Kelley offered some
guidance. "The relationships between the so-called soviet
Government and the Third International is neither fortuitous
nor accidental," he said. "The bond between the two arises
not merely from the fact that there exists a mutual
solidarity of material interests, but rather from the fact
that they represented to a certain extent coordinate organs
whose functions are different.,,209 This, of course, was the
same point Kelley had made during the recognition hearings
in January 1924; to wit, that the only real distinction
between the soviet Government, the Russian Communist party,
and the Third International was in the names, and in all
three power was vested in the same leaders.
The lecture on "Economic Aspects of the Bolshevik
Regime" explained the reasons for the communists' shift from
the period of "military communism" to the period of the "New
'O'RobertKelley, "Third or Communist International,"
January 5, 1926, p. 25, FSS.
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Economic Policy" or "state Capitalism. ,,210 The lecture on
"Foreign Policy of the Bolshevik Regime" was delivered in
two sessions and addressed the development of the
Bolsheviks' foreign policy, beginning on November 7, 1917,
when the communists came to power: Kelley repeatedly
underscored the point, "Although the Ultimate aim of the
soviet regime has remained the same -- world revolution and
the establishment of a whole soviet republic -- its
immediate foreign policy -- that is, its tactics -- has
undergone considerable changes. ,,211 In this presentation,
Kelley again made use of communist writings to reinforce his
points. He concluded with a personal jUdgment: "A spirit of
menace and reprisal pervades the foreign intercourse of the
soviet Government." According to the Soviet leaders, Kelley
said, "the world is divided into two warring classes
11212 and while the communist leaders might accept a.,
temporary modus vivendi with capitalistic countries, their
goal "remains the same -- world revolution. ,,213
21°RobertKelley, "Economic Aspects of the Bolshevik
Regime," December 23, 1925, pp. 1-2, FSS.
21'RobertKelley, "Foreign Policy of the Bolshevik
Regime," December 29, 1925, p. 4, FSS. The second section
of this lecture was entitled, "Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Regime (continued)," December 30, 1925, FSS.
212Ibid.,p , 17.
2"Ibid., p , 6.
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Kelley's third category concerned the "Problem of
Recognition of the soviet union. ,,2" In analyzing this
issue, he stated that "recognition" held a different meaning
for the soviet regime than for the states of Western Europe.
To the former, recognition represented "a temporary
expedient" essential until the "advent of the world
revolution."'" To the Western states, recognition entailed
settlement of debts, the question of confiscated property,
and cessation of propaganda. Even if the soviets agreed to
these conditions, Kelley felt they could not be trusted to
honor their promises. The experiences of Great Britain and
France following those governments' recognitions of Soviet
Russia were discussed. 216 Kelly restated the position of the
united states. "If I am correct in my interpretation of its
attitude," he said, the government of the united states
"does not propose to enter into relations with a regime
which repudiates obligations" and continues "subversive
activities" in the united States.2" The Soviet government
simply had not, in Kelley's view, met "the acid test of good
faith. ,,218
2"Robert Kelley, "Problem of Recognition of the Soviet






Kelley's lectures were typed, double spaced, on two
hundred and twenty-one pages of legal size paper. That
measurement is easily calculated. What is more difficult to
quantify is how much influence the lectures had on the
students at the Foreign Service School. When Earl Packer
was asked this question, he shrugged, "It would be a
tremendous task to demonstrate the impact of the Foreign
service School on the thought of the diplomatic trainees. ,,219
The conclusions the students formed concerning World-Russian
relations and particularly American-Russian relations as a
result of Kelley's lectures are not definitely known. What
can be shown is that the only viewpoints presented to the
trainees on the Soviets were the antipathetic views of
Kelley and the Eastern Europeanists. Particularly because
there were few scholars of Russian Affairs in the united
states, these lectures may well have been the first and only
academic discussion to which young officers were exposed
before they were assigned to the field. with the passage of
the Rogers' Act, all newly-accepted officers were required
to attend the school, and since Kelley remained the State
Department's resident Russian expert until 1937, it is
likely that his influence was significant.
That said, in fairness it must be added: these
lectures are impressive historical documents. They were
well-researched, logical, and representative of the thinking
21'Packer Interview, February, 1989, New York City, N.Y.
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and the position of the state Department at the time. The
nonrecognition policy was, after all, not Kelley's policy,
but rather, as Kelley wrote, "a Wilson-Colby-Harding-Hughes-
Coolidge-Kellogg one. ,,220Kelley simply perpetuated that
policy. He was instrumental in planning and organizing the
training of Russian language specialists. He influenced all
the trainees who attended the Foreign Service School.
Moreover, copies of all his lectures were sent to American
Embassies and legations around the world as a means of
educating the staffs at those locations and making it
possible for America's diplomats to speak with one anti-
communist voice. 221
****
After sixteen years, in 1933, a new and determined
president made the decision to recognize officially soviet
Russia. Kelley, who knew "all the dots and commas of
Bolshevik documents of the past, ,,222was asked to draft the
recognition agreement. One may be sure that the irony of
this situation did not escape Kelley. Yet whatever his
personal misgivings, he remained silent. Kelley was, after
all, and as has often been written, "a taciturn man," and
22°Kelleyto Harper, March 10, 1925, Harpers Papers,
University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
22'Mostof Kelley's lectures are stamped "Confidential"
and are stamped with the instructions: "Copy for Consul at _
To be delivered by personal messenger or other safe
means as opportunity offers; not to be transmitted by mail."
222SamuelHarper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 202.
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now he simply rededicated himself to protecting America and
American interests from the soviets.
CHAPTER V
THE KELLEY-ROOSEVELT CONFLICT
For months the officials of the Eastern European
Division had followed with avid attention and not a little
apprehension the maneuvers of the new president and his
special assistant, William Bullitt, who had, at first
surreptitiously and later openly, promoted America's
official recognition of the Soviet government. 223 The press
release on the afternoon of October 20, 1933, which
announced the exchange of messages between President
Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin
merely confirmed their suspicions.
Roosevelt, in a first step toward ending sixteen years
of official silence, had acknowledged "the present abnormal
relations" between "the hundred and twenty-five million
people of the united States and the hundred and sixty
million people of Russia." The difficulties between the two
nations were not "insoluble," the President wrote, and could
be "removed only by frank, friendly conversations ....I shall
be glad to receive any representative you may designate to
explore with me personally all questions outstanding between
2230rville H. BUllitt, For the President: Personal and
Secret (Boston, 1972) pp. 21-39.
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our two countries. ,,224Kalinin' s prompt reply termed the
past situation "regrettable." The difficulties, "present
and arising," the soviet President wrote, "...can be solved
only when direct relations exist ...they have no chance for
solution in the absence of such relations. ,,22'Kalinin
promised to send Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, to discuss the situation.
The ordinarily unflappable Kelley was visibly
frustrated and, as his friend Harper recorded, "serious, as
well as much excited. ,,226 Kelley and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull had both urged Roosevelt to arrange private,
"informal conferences" in order to resolve the questions
which separated the two countries. They recommended that
this be done before any pUblic overtures were made to the
soviet Government. 227
Roosevelt had decided otherwise. Bypassing normal
state Department channels, he had communicated directly with
the Russians and planned to handle the negotiations himself.
Clearly, Kelley's myriad memoranda had gone unheeded.
Kelley was further alarmed because Russia would be
represented by a man whose career Kelley had followed for
224FRUS,The Soviet Union, pp , 17-18.
22'Ibid.,p. 18.
226Harper, The Russia I Believe In, 200.
~7Cordell Hull, The Diary of Cordell Hull, Vol. I, pp.
293-299.
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years. Maxim Litvinov had a reputation as a shrewd
horsetrader, and as Kelley well knew, that reputation was
not undeserved. 228 To Kelley and the Eastern Europeanists,
the future appeared ominous.
The united states' long delayed recognition of the
soviet union has been the subject of many books and numerous
articles. These studies have tended to focus on the
question of why Roosevelt chose to recognize the Soviets.
Some historians have argued that he hoped to increase trade
in order to aid America's sUffering economy. others have
advanced the thesis that recognition was meant to serve as a
subtle warning to the Japanese to reconsider any aggressive
plans she might have in the Far East. There is evidence to
support the validity of each argument, but which carries the
greater weight continues to be the sUbject of some
controversy. 229
A question less frequently addressed in these studies
and the one Roosevelt posed in 1933, was: Why not recognize
228Robert Kelley, "Statements by Litvinov on Matters of
Foreign Policy That Are of Interest to the United States,"
National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, 661.44/Litvinov,
M.M./15 No.8. November 3, 1933. cited in John Richman,
The United states and the Soviet Union, p. 130; Henry
Roberts, "Maxim Litvinov," in The Diplomats, Gordon A. craig
and Felix Gilbert, editors, pp. 344-377. While it appears
that Kelley was unaware of the exchange of messages until
after the fact, he reported to historian, Robert Paul
Browder, that Roosevelt and Bullitt "worded and reworded"
the message in order to "insure the appointment of
Litvinov." See: Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of
Soviet-American Diplomacy, p. 116.
229See citations throughout study.
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Soviet Russia? After all, the official reasons given for
nonrecognition had always been repudiated debts, confiscated
property, and anti-capitalist propaganda. Yet, after
sixteen years, the debts remained unpaid, the property had
not been returned, and the communist propaganda continued.
Roosevelt determined that the interests of America
would be better served by official recognition of the Soviet
government. The time for "negative leverage -- the stick,"
had passed. Furthermore, Roosevelt believed that the
"sentimental prejudice against the U.S.S.R. [was]
nonsense, ,,"0 and he certainly had no fear that any communist
conspiracy could succeed in overthrowing the government of
the united States. This was a man, after all, who in his
recent inaugural address had said, "The only thing we have
to fear is fear itself." Roosevelt believed that most
outstanding problems between the two countries would be
resolved during "the frank, friendly conversations" and that
any others could be decided following formal recognition.
This was the point of departure between Kelley and
Roosevelt. Kelley was convinced that all "serious
obstacles" between the two countries should be resolved
prior to pUblic meetings and certainly before official
recognition. These divergent points of view and the actions
of the two men who espoused them provided much of the drama
surrounding the events leading to recognition.
2"Walter Duranty, I Write As I Please, p , 321.
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Historically, the prominence of Roosevelt's role has
been fully documented. Kelley is generally credited with
also having made important if begrudged contributions.
Often Roosevelt is characterized as the liberal and
triumphant protagonist while Kelley is portrayed as the
hardened and obstinate anti-communist antagonist. The
evidence suggests, however, that by 1933, Kelley, like
Roosevelt, was reconciled to the inevitability of official
recognition of soviet Russia. Each man worked toward the
same goal, though their methods differed and their
approaches to problem solving were in conflict. The
evidence further implies that if Kelley's approach had been
followed, while recognition might have been delayed, the
eventual relationship between the two countries might well
have been stronger. In any event, in this situation
Kelley's role was pivotal and is deserving of closer
examination.
The six men who planned the recognition conference
shared at least one characteristic: they were all ambitious
statesmen who possessed and enjoyed the use of power.
Kelley had perhaps the most enigmatic personality and
because he left no diaries and few personal letters, 231 his
motives remain shrouded in mystery. A simplified
explanation has often been given in order to explain his
231See Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.
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actions. For example, nearly all historians write that
Kelley opposed recognition in 1933. Some writers have cast
him in the role of Cassandra, one who was right but not
believed. Others have insisted that Kelley was so adamantly
opposed to recognizing the Soviets and so convinced that
recognition represented a foolhardy policy that his actions
guaranteed its failure. Consequently, they write, Kelley
bears the responsibility for the uneasy relationship which
has existed between America and Russia ever since. 232
This is a heavy charge for one man to bear, but before
attempting to answer that charge it may be illuminating to
look at the man Kelley had become by 1933. It has already
been established that Kelley was young, brilliant, hard-
working and dedicated. He was also ambitious, though money
was not his primary goal. In a 1933 interview, Kelley's
father, James Kelley, spoke of his son:
Some years ago, it seemed to me that he had equipped
himself for a business or professional career, where
the remuneration would be greater than the army or the
Consular Service. He listened to me and said that
money was not everything in the world. He liked his
work in the State Department and association with such
men as Charles Evans Hughes and Colonel stimson,
Secretary of State was more to him than a big
salary.233
232See: Maddux, Years of Estrangement, Bibl iographical
Essay, pp. 207-212.
232BostonGlobe - October 29, 1933 "R.F. Kelley of
Somerville and West Roxbury is State Dept's Expert on
Russia," copy in Kelley Papers, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.
105
This interview establishes that Kelley enjoyed
associating with politically powerful men, but what were his
own ambitions? His rise had been very rapid when he first
entered the foreign service, but by 1933 he had held the
position of Chief of the Eastern European Division for eight
years without advancement. Did he have further ambitions?
A copy of a letter written by Constantine McGuire to
Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana provides some insight
into Kelley's aspirations. 234 McGuire, a former Harvard
professor and one time teacher of Kelley, was an influential
figure in Washington, D.C. who preferred to work behind the
scenes, but who nevertheless wielded considerable political
clout.
Walsh, a close political associate of Roosevelt's, had
recently been chosen as the Attorney-General-Designate by
the newly elected president. McGuire wrote Walsh that
Kelley was "admirably qualified to serve as Assistant
Secretary of State. ,,235After outlining Kelley' s impressive
qualifications, McGuire added:
234Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January
25, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington,
D. C.; McGuire apparently left instructions that his
personal papers were to be destroyed after his death;
biographical information on Senator Thomas Walsh can be
found in: James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story The Roosevelt
Years, pp. 17, 21, 28, 33.
235Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January
25, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington
D.C.
106
•.•as you can well imagine, the gentry who run the
state Department have had him around because they
had to have someone qualified to do what he does--
not because of his race, religion, or social
background ....Kelley is wonderfully discreet and
diligent, .•••But I suppose that you would have to
ask for it very definitely from Mr. Roosevelt,
inasmuch as the "white-spat brigade" are banking
upon Sumner Welles to distribute these jobs among
them. 236
This letter was dated January 25, 1933. Unexpectedly on
March 2, 1933 Senator Walsh died -- and with him one would
suppose, Kelley's hopes for being named Assistant Secretary
of state.237
A clue to what may have been Kelley's fondest ambition
was found in a letter John Wiley wrote Loy Henderson three
years after recognition and immediately following Bullitt's
reassignment to Paris from Moscow. In the context of
discussing who would be appointed as the new American
ambassador to Moscow, Wiley wrote, "[Bob thinks:] When a new
ambassador is appointed; he will probably ...be carefully
handpicked. In consequence, Bob doesn't think there is any
chance of Bob's appointment. ,,238Another example of Kelley's
interest in assignment to Moscow can be found in a letter
from Arthur Bliss Lane, Minister to the Baltics, to R.
Walton Moore, assistant secretary of state. The letter
236Ibid.
23'JamesA. Farley, Jim Farley's story The Roosevelt
Years, p. 36. It is interesting to note that Walsh, McGuire
and Kelley were all Irish Catholics.
2"John Wiley to Loy Henderson, August 29, 1936. Wiley
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
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dated June 18, 1937, expresses Lane's opposition to Kelley's
transfer to the Moscow embassy. 239 These letters establish
Kelley's interest in a Moscow assignment and although
supportive evidence is lacking, it may be speculated that
Kelley had perhaps aspired to be appointed the first
ambassador to Russia following recognition.
Kelley was not only ambitious, he was pragmatic.
Having reconciled himself to the inevitability of the united
states' recognition of the Soviets, he was determined not
only to protect the interests of the united states but to
advance the careers of his friends. On January 30, 1933, in
a confidential letter to John Wiley, Kelley wrote:
The question [of diplomatic assignments] might just
present itself in the form of selecting some officers to
accompany a mission to Moscow ....Don't forget, also,
that it is not a bad thing to be where the spot light is
playing and after we reestablish relations with Russia
the spot light is going to play on Moscow for some
Iittle time. 240
Kelly was suggesting that Wiley might well be one of the
officers. Undoubtedly, Kelley foresaw this "mission" as the
private conference which would settle the outstanding
problems between the two countries prior to recognition. It
"'Lane to Moore, June 18, 1937. cited in Maddux, Years
of Estrangement: American Relations with the soviet Union,
1933-1941, footnote 22, p. 192. Lane and Kelley had
disagreed in the past over the Russian section at Riga.
This letter was written at the time the Eastern European
Division was eliminated.
24°Robert Kelley to John Wiley, January 30, 1933, wiley
papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
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would be interesting to know if he saw himself heading that
delegation.
There is some evidence that the activities of the
Japanese in Manchuria in 1931 may have softened Kelley's
opposition to cooperation between America and the soviets.
Boris Skvirsky, who was a Russian agent of AMTORG241and
Russia's unofficial ambassador, wired Moscow on April 20,
1932, "Even Kelly [sic] declared in a chat with me that the
existence of normal relations between the United states of
America and the U.S.S.R. would have a favorable influence on
the Far East. "242 Kelley I s view of the Japanese must have
been at least partially based on the information he received
from John Wiley, whose letters from Warsaw reported a
possible "Japanese-Polish offensive agreement," a rumored
"expropriation of the Chinese Eastern Railway" by the
Japanese, "the continuation of the Sino-Japanese conflict"
and the "demarche of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo. "243
241AMTORGwas an acronym for American Russian Trade
Organization.
242Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR [Foreign policy
documents of the USSR], 22 Vols, (Moscow, 1957-77) 1:488-89;
quoted in Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakoviev, tr.
Olga Adler Titelbaum, Russia and the united States, p. 103.
243JohnWiley to Robert Kelley, December 14, 1931; John
wiley to Robert Kelley, April 4, 1932; John Wiley to Robert
Kelley, October 10, 1931; Ibid. Also see: John Wiley to
Robert Kelley, April 29, 1932; March 21, 1932; January 27,
1932; December 22, 1931; October 30, 1931; Wiley Papers, FDR
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
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The Japanese clearly were making the Russians very
nervous. Russian sentiment was summed up nicely by Walter
Duranty, the New York Times correspondent stationed in
Moscow:
...I'm inclined to think that the line taken by
stimson [Secretary of State] in his letter to Borah was
quite an encouragement to people here and reduced to
some extent their feeling of isolation. However remote
the USA might be diplomatically, there is no denying a
certain similarity or parallel of attitude between the
two countries on the Far-Eastern question in general and
Manchuria in particular. '"
Kelley was not unaware of these attitudes. Kelley's
relaxation towards the Soviets was noted by news columnist,
George Abala on January 20, 1931 in the Washington Daily
News:
The most conservative of the ultra conservative State
Department clique is Robert Kelley ....Usually he can
spot the pink tinge of a communist a mile away. But he
didn't even blink when Boris E. Skvirsky, Washington
'''WalterDuranty quoted by John Wiley in a letter to
Robert Kelley, March 21, 1932, Wiley Papers, FDR Library,
Hyde Park, N.Y. Duranty was a much respected English
reporter who had covered Russian affairs from the time of
the Bolshevik Revolution. For background on Duranty see:
Walter Duranty, I write As I Please, and Walter Duranty,
USSR. The letter referred to, is stimson's letter to Borah
dated February 23, 1932 and concerned the draft treaty laid
before the Washington Conference. stimson wrote, "The
Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament
conference aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the
world ...by the solution of ...problems ...particularly in the
Far East." Eugene Dooman, Oral History Collection, p. 26,
Columbia University, New York city, N.Y. Dooman served as
Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo for many years and argues that
if the advise of Ambassador Joseph Grew had been heeded, the
American-Japanese War might well have been avoided. Albeit
a partisan view, his history is most helpful in
understanding the Far East conflicts in the 1920's and
1930's.
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agent of AMTORG recently called him. He greeted Boris
like an old trLend.?"
This columnist, like so many others, totally misunderstood
Kelley, who loved Russians as much as he hated their
communist ideology. He drank vodka, ate in Russian
restaurants and enjoyed the double entendres possible in the
Russian language. 2"
The Russians apparently felt the same affection for
Kelley. In 1935, at a time when the American-Russian
relationship had again soured to a state of official
distrust, Kelley visited Moscow. Loy Henderson wrote John
Wiley at that time: "Kelley is leaving Moscow tonight after
a month's stay. I think that he has enjoyed himse1f ....The
Russians made a great fuss over him. ,,247To Kelley, the
Russian communists were his beloved enemies, and by 1933 he
realized that they could be diplomatically ignored no
longer.
Of all the statesmen involved, Roosevelt needs the
least introduction. Here, it is only important to remember
2"George Abala, "Most Conservative of the Ultra
Conservative st. Dept. clique is Robert Kelley .... :",
Washington Daily News, January 20, 1931, copy in scrapbook,
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
246SamuelHarper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 201: Also
see: Letter of invitation to attend colloquy in Miami, 1975,
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.:
Harper-Kelley correspondence 1925-1040, University of
Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
247LoyHenderson to John Wiley, November 91, 1935, Wiley
Papers, FOR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
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that this was the prewar Roosevelt. He had served as a New
York state senator until President Woodrow Wilson appointed
him assistant secretary of the navy. He was elected
Governor of New York in 1928, and President of the united
states in 1932.
A bold and confident popular leader, Roosevelt
possessed great charm and a ready wit. In the field of
domestic pOlicy he had experience and a plan; in the area of
foreign policy, he had minimal experience, no plan, and
little confidence in career diplomats, whom he considered
"wealthy young men who got entirely out of touch with
American affairs. ,,248 Roosevelt compared their work "with
the mating of elephants: a lot of noise and motion, but it
took eighteen months to produce anything."'· In his
journal, the diplomat, Jay Pierrepont Moffat wrote, "What
apparently struck Hoover and Mills [Ogden L. Mills,
secretary of the Treasury] was his [Roosevelt's] ignorance
of the general problems facing the Administration,
particularly in the foreign field."'~
- t' .Henry S lmson, Personal Dlary, entry of 1-9-33,
103, Yale University Library, quoted in John Richman,
United states and the Soviet Union, p. 11.
''''WillBrownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to
Greatness--A Biography of William C. BUllitt, p. 141.
p.
The
'~Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers, edited by
Nancy Harvison Hooker, Journal entry of November 23, 1932,
p. 77.
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Members of Roosevelt's own cabinet were likewise
critical of his handling of foreign policy and his total
disregard for normal diplomatic channels. "Numerous
occasions were later to arise," wrote Cordell Hull, "when
the President preferred ...to communicate directly with the
heads of other governments ....I doubted the wisdom of this
course. ,,251William Phillips, Roosevelt's Under Secretary of
State, recalled, "I felt that we would have been in a much
better position to negotiate if the President had not taken
the initiati ve. ,,252Roosevelt was determined to recognize
Russia, however, and once his presidency was secured he
began to act.253 The best explanation of why, is perhaps the
one advanced by Earl Packer, who was assistant chief of "EE"
at the time. "The impression I have," Packer recalled, "is
that Roosevelt wanted to do something striking in the area
of foreign affairs. I still carry the impression that it
was primarily Roosevelt's decision. "m.
Roosevelt's distrust of career diplomats led him to
choose William Bullitt as his tutor in foreign affairs. As
25'Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Volumes I-
II, p . 298.
-William Phillips, Oral History Collection, p. 104,
Columbia University, New York City, N.Y.
2"That Roosevelt had made this decision before his
inauguration was well known by insiders at the time and is
documented throughout the contemporary literature.
2~packer Interview, February 17, 1989, New York City,
N.Y.
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a result, Bullitt came to playa dominant part in the
preparations for the recognition conference and was
subsequently rewarded by being named Ambassador to Russia.
Only forty-two years old, Bullitt was a charming, witty,
ambitious and well educated man possessing a winsome nature
and a bright spirit.
In 1919 Bullitt had traveled to Russia with the
approval of President Wilson and had arranged terms for a
truce with Lenin. Upon his return to Versailles, Bullitt's
efforts to gain approval for the truce were spurned.
Angered, Bullitt resigned and publicly testified at a Senate
Hearing attacking Wilson and the Versailles agreement. Many
career diplomats had never forgiven him this childish,
disloyal and unprofessional behavior. Roosevelt however,
found Bullitt engaging company, and the two developed a
close social and professional relationship. Roosevelt,
chose Bullitt to be his "Russian expert," and since Bullitt
lacked much knowledge of Russian affairs, he in turn was
forced to find his own Russian expert. It was in this way
that Bullitt came to rely on Kelley.255
255Forfurther information on Bullitt see: Orville
BUllitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt; William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia;
Kelley/Bullitt Correspondence, 1934-1935, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Bullitt's letters
may not be photocopied as of this date (1989),); Beatrice
Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and Soviet Russia; John
Richman, The united States and the Soviet Union, Chapter II;
will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to
Greatness, A Biography of William C. Bullitt; also see:
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull's role in the
preparations and actual negotiations was minor; some have
suggested by Roosevelt's design. In his diary the former
Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, described Hull as a man
who lacked "vitality and vigor. ,,256The career diplomat,
Eugene Dooman, described him as a politician who
"came ...from the ordinary people," was "legalistic" in his
approach to international problems, and "was lacking in that
flexibility and that knowledge which distinguished such men
as Hughes and to some extent stimson. ,,257In his diary, Hull
wrote that he told Roosevelt, "I favor recognizing Russia."
Hull made quite clear, however, that he favored informal
conferences as a first step.2.
Memoirs of contemporaries listed in bibliography.
256Henrystimson, Diary, entry for 2/25/1933, pp. 96-97,
quoted in John Richman, The united states and the Soviet
Union, p , 11.
257Eugene Dooman, Oral History Collection, Columbia
University, New York City.
2·cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p , 297.
For a further discussion of Hull's position see: Robert E.
Bowers, "Hull, Russian Subversion in Cuba, and Recognition
of the U.S.S.R.," Journal of American History, 53, June-
March, 1966-67. It has been claimed that Roosevelt chose
weak men for the top positions in the State Department
because he wanted to be his own Secretary of State. John
Richman, The United States and the Soviet Government, p. 11.
It seems more likely that Hull was appointed because he had
originally, and with some reason, expected to be Roosevelt's
running mate but to secure the nomination, Roosevelt chose
John Nance Garner instead. James Farley, Jim Farley Story,
p. 25, 33.
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William Phillips was Under-Secretary of State in
Roosevelt's cabinet. In his memoirs, Phillips wrote that he
"regretted" that Roosevelt had made the first overture to
the Soviets because that put the united States on the
"defensive. ,,25'Phillips was more critical of Roosevelt in
his oral history, although he saved his greatest wrath for
the Soviets. "We didn't know then that we could never trust
a Soviet official around the corner.,,250
Judge Walton Moore was appointed Assistant Secretary
of State following the early resignation of Raymond Moley
from Roosevelt's cabinet in September 1933.261 Moore was a
bachelor, described by a society columnist as "a Virginia
gentleman of the old school, intelligent and flattering.
Another columnist wrote, Walton Moore, while "charming was a
novice at foreign affairs. ,,262Moore and Hull, both Southern
Democrats, had often worked together in Congress to promote
the interests of their region. Moore and Bullitt's father
had been roommates while at law school, and during 1933
25'William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p , 74.
25~illiam Phillips, Oral History Collections, p. 105,
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
261Forinformation on Moley see:
Seven Years. (New York, N.Y., 1937)
comments on William Bullitt are often
the period. See: Ibid., p. 137.
Raymond Moley, After
Moley's pejorative
cited in studies of
262HelenEssary, Town and Country, February 1936; Drew
Pearson and Robert s. Allen, "Merry-Go-Round," The Daily
Washington, 1934 exact date uncertain, both articles in
Kelley Papers, Georgetown, Washington, D.C.
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Bullitt developed a relationship with Moore which continued
for years.
These intertwining relationships strengthened the
negotiation group and, although their approaches varied, by
the time of Litvinov's arrival, these six men represented a
formidable and cohesive combination. Most importantly, with
the possible exception of Roosevelt, they had all come to
rely on Kelley for information on Russian affairs.
Roosevelt turned to BUllitt, but since Bullitt's knowledge
was limited, he too was forced to depend on Kelley. This
then was the situation in the summer and early fall of 1933
as the American team prepared the terms for recognition.
Roosevelt, who was determined to recognize the Soviet
government, used Bullitt for the initial contact.'ro Bullitt
had been named as Assistant to the Secretary of State and
attended the London Economic Conference which was held in
~3For a discussion of economic reasons, see: Robert E.
Bowers, "American Diplomacy, the 1933 Wheat Conference and
Recognition of the Soviet union." Agricultural History,
Vol. XL, January 1966; Robert E. Bowers and Jeannette P.
Nichols, "Roosevelt's Monetary Diplomacy in 1933." The
American Historical Review, Vol. LVI, October 1950-July
1951; William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations,
1781-1947, Chapter 8; for the Japanese factor, see: Joan
Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics, pp. 120-121; Edward
Bennett, Franklin Roosevelt and the Search for Security, p.
16. For a discussion of Russian Japanese Relations, see:
Harriet Lucy Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945,
pp. 1-42.
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June-July 1933.264 While there he held two friendly
discussions with Litvinov, to smooth the way for future
meetings between representatives of the two countries.~5
Bullitt's correspondence to Roosevelt while attending this
conference is demonstrative of his wit and his bravura. His
observations also call into question his jUdgment. Bullitt
was, after all, writing as an official representative of the
united states to the President of that country, which
suggests that some degree of decorum and protocol should
have been observed. Plainly, it was not. In these letters,
Bullitt repeated a remark, likening the British Prime
Secretary, Ramsey MacDonald, to a "squirming eel" and wrote
that the French Premier, George E. Bonnet, "is as
cooperative as a rattlesnake." Bullitt saved his meanest
cut for John Simon, Britain Foreign Minister, of whom
Bullitt wrote, "The trouble with Simon is that when they
~4Bullitt's successful plan to join the Roosevelt
administration can be easily traced. See: Louis B. Wehle,
Hidden Threads of History, pp. 110-115; Orville H. BUllitt,
editor, For the President: Personal and Secret:
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt, pp. 17-33; Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, pp.
135-137.
2~Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933. Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February
1934. Bullitt wrote, "I told him [Litvinov] that of course
you would require an absolute pledge from the Russian
Government to refrain from all propaganda directed against
our institutions ...." p. 292.
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circumcised him, they threw away the wrong piece. ,,266
Bullitt often made rash pUblic statements during the
conference. This was typical of Bullitt's behavior and as a
result he was little respected in the international
community. But while Bullitt might be viewed in Europe with
disdain, he was one of the few men who enjoyed the
confidence of Roosevelt in the months preceding recognition.
As a logical conclusion of this confidence, it was
Bullitt whom Roosevelt designated to make the initial
contact with the soviets. On October 11, 1933, he went to
the office of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.267to meet Boris
Skvirsky, Moscow's unofficial ambassador, who lived in
Washington, D.C. Bullitt gave Skvirsky an unsigned carbon
copy of Roosevelt's invitation to Kalinin. Skvirsky was
instructed to transmit the text in "his most private code to
Moscow" and upon receipt of "a satisfactory reply" from
266Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 3, 5, 6 FOR
Library, PSF, London Economic Conference, Box 156, Hyde
Park, N.Y., quoted in John Richman, The united states and
the soviet Union, p. 29. The "eel" and "rattlesnake" quotes
are included in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs,
Vol. I: January 1933-February 1934, Letter, William C.
BUllitt, Executive Officer, American Delegation, London
Economic Conference to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 289-294.
The derogatory comment on Simon is omitted although there
are no ellipses to indicate the omission. simon however is
discussed and in less than glowing terms. p. 292.
267Morgenthau, whom Roosevelt had appointed head of the
Farm Credit Administration, was a close personal friend of
Roosevelt's and one of his intimate advisors. In May 1933,
Morgenthau was placed in charge of Russian trade
negotiations. In this way he became involved in Russian
loan negotiations.
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Kalinin, a signed copy of Roosevelt's invitation would be
delivered to Skvirsky. Bullitt cautioned Skvirsky that
there should be "absolutely no pUblicity" and that President
Roosevelt "should control the time and form of any
publicity" should Moscow's reply be satisfactory.268
Kalinin's reply was jUdged to be acceptable and
Roosevelt signed the original copy of his message which
Bullitt then delivered to Skvirsky on October 18, 1933.
Skvirsky, in turn gave Bullitt a signed text of Kalinin's
message and Roosevelt announced the exchange of messages at
his regular press conference on Friday, October 20, 1933.
Roosevelt made it very clear to the newsmen that these
letters did not imply recognition. "This is a request and
an acceptance of the thought of sitting together at a table
to see whether we can devise means for settling various
problems that exist between two great nations, two great
people. ,,269 When reporters asked which problems, Roosevelt
became vague. "...there are a lot of them that have come up
in the past sixteen years .... ',vo Although Roosevelt chose
268Forthe President: Personal and Secret, Bullitt to
Hull, October 11, 1933, pp. 42-43. For other accounts see:
Thomas R. Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American Relations
with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941, pp. 15-16; Robert Paul
Browder, The origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, pp. 116-
117; Donald Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements.
268Roosevelt at Press Conference, October 20, 1933.
Edger Nixon, editor, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934, pp. 434.
27°Ibid.,435.
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not to discuss these specific questions with reporters, by
October 20, 1933, he had a pretty well defined list of those
problems which he had concluded must be arbitrated before
formal recognition was confirmed. His list fell far short
of the full resolution of all outstanding problems and
certainly failed to satisfy state Department officials,
particularly Kelley.
In the months which preceded the exchange of letters,
Kelley and the Eastern European Division had produced
hundreds of pages of reports. The reports were a
combination of background information, problems to be
resolved, and analysis.
As early as July, 1933, Kelley prepared a report
entitled, "Problems Pertaining to Russian-American Relations
Which in the Interests of Priendly Relations between the
United states and Russia, should be settled prior to the
Recogni tion of the soviet Government. ,,271 A copy of this
memorandum was handed by Acting Secretary of State Phillips
to Roosevelt on July 27, 1933.
The opening paragraph of the memorandum was a warning
and, retrospectively, a prophecy. Kelley cautioned that the
removal of all "serious obstacles" between the two
governments was necessary prior to recognition if "friendly
'''PRUS,The soviet Union 1933-1939, pp , 6-11. This
report was requested by Harry Franklin Payer who was an
assistant secretary of state until November 1934 when he was
appointed chief of the Foreign Export Division.
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cooperation" between the two governments was to develop.
Otherwise, he wrote, "in view of the extraordinary nature of
these obstacles," official relations became "the source of
friction and ill will rather than the mainspring of
cooperation and good will." He cited the unsatisfactory
experiences of other countries who had recognized the soviet
government. If formal diplomatic relations were established
without "mutual understanding and common principles," Kelley
argued, the results would be useless to both Russia and
America and only lead to "friction and rancor."'"
Kelley analyzed the three major problems, which in his
view required solutions in the interest of "the
establishment of harmonious and mutually beneficial
relations" to both countries. The first and "fundamental
obstacle" was the "Problem of Communist World Revolutionary
Activities." The second "serious difficulty" was the
"Question of Repudiated Debts and Confiscated Property."
The third was the "Problem of Bridging the Differences
Between the Economic and Social Structure of the united
States and Russia. ,,273
The first two problems were ones which Kelley had
addressed many times before and the wording differed very
little from his previous studies. His one notable addition
in analyzing the revolutionary activities of the communists
272 b i.dI 1 ., pp. 6, 7, 9.
273Ib'd1 ., pp . 6, 7, 9.
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was the sentence: "Even when these activities do not
constitute a present menace to the established order, the
systematic interference of a foreign power in the domestic
affairs of a country constitutes ipso facto a source of deep
resentment and unavoidable friction. ,,274 Most likely this
sentence was inserted in response to the increasingly
popular argument that communist activities had persisted for
sixteen years without serious consequences to the social or
economic structure of the united states.
In discussing the repudiated debts and confiscated
property issues, Kelley reinforced his earlier arguments by
insisting that while these issues remained unresolved "the
basis of ordinary credit to the soviet government" would
severely handicap "the development of commercial relations
between Russia and foreign countries. ,,275 In reality this
had not been the case during the nonrecognition period, as
businessmen in the united states were skilled at the art of
creative finance and commercial relations between the two
countries had prospered. Kelley listed the dollar losses
the united states had suffered as a result of debt
repudiation and property confiscation. The gross figure
listed was six hundred and twenty-eight million dollars
($628 million) but of greater significance was the fact that
in parentheses after repudiated obligations were two words:
274 b idIl.,p.8.
275Ibid., p . 8
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"principal only. ,,276The issue of interest apparently was
not discussed during the recognition sessions and
understandably would cause major repercussions later. After
all, even a small percentage of interest on a debt of this
amount calculated over a period of sixteen years would have
amounted to a sizeable sum of money.
Kelley urged that the debt problem be solved prior to
recognition. In another prophetic statement he wrote, "It
is to be especially emphasized that if the questions of
repudiated debts and confiscated property are not settled
prior to recognition, there is little likelihood that
sUbsequent negotiations would result in a mutually
satisfactory settlement. ,,277Kelley urged that safeguards
should be included in the recognition agreement so that
there would not be "any retroactive effect which would be
prejudicial to American interests. ,,27.In this instance
Kelley had in mind counter claims the Russians insisted were
due them as a result of damages inflicted during America's
military intervention fifteen years earlier.
The third problem was one which Kelley had not
examined as closely in the past, and his conclusions were
based on studies of Russian-European relations. Kelley
argued that individual businessmen forced to do business
276Ibid.,p. 8.
277Ibid.,p. 8.
27·Ib~d., 9 10~ pp. - .
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with a state monopoly were at a distinct disadvantage.
Moreover, the laws of Russia, and "the communist conception
of justice is so alien" to other countries, that problems
had arisen, particularly in the area of "economic
espionage. ,,279 This was but the first of many papers Kelley
sent to the White House in 1933. Following Roosevelt's
announcement of the invitation to Moscow, Kelley sent
several expanded studies dealing with different aspects of
each problem.2M These studies had some influence. If the
writings of Hull, Moore, Phillips and Bullitt are closely
analyzed they show the imprint of Kelley's reasoning. For
example, the word "weapon" is often used as a metaphor for
"loans and credits." In connection with this, it is
interesting, in view of the subsequent argument over the
terms "loans" and "credits" and the united states assertion
that the terms were used synonymously, to note that Kelley
in a memo dated September 25, 1933, wrote, "in the form of
loans or credits. ,,281
The debt issues were the ones which would later cause
the greatest rancor between the two governments. The manner
279Ibl'd., 9 10pp. - .
28'Foran in depth analysis, see: Richman, The United
states and The Soviet union, 113-124. Kelley's reports are
listed on p. 263, footnote 13, National Archives, Diplomatic
Branch, No.1 8001.51 W89 U.S.S.R/13-3/4; 10/20/1933; No.2
861.51/2622-1/2, 10/20/1933; No.3, 46'1.11/198-1/2,
10/20/1933; No.4, 811.00B/1608, 10/20/1933; No.5,
361.11/4089-1/2 10/20/1933.
281FRUS,The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 14.
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in which the preparations for the meetings was handled and
the way in which the negotiations were conducted, almost
guaranteed that result. In this instant, Roosevelt and
Kelley must both share blame. Once Roosevelt had made the
decision to recognize the soviet government, his principal
concern was the reaction of the American public. By
insisting on religious freedom for Americans in Russia and a
cessation of communist propaganda in America, the pUblic
supported Roosevelt's position. Roosevelt finally settled
the debt issue by signing a "gentleman's agreement," the
details of which were to be worked out later. Roosevelt
most probably would have been willing to agree to a token
payment which would have allowed the two countries to start
a fresh relationship. But of course, this was not possible
with Kelley lobbying to exact full payment plus interest.
Nor was Kelley the only member of the negotiating team
who felt that way. By November 1933, Kelley had
successfully convinced Hull, Phillips, Moore, and even
BUllitt, of the correctness of his position. The situation
had developed into a war of personalities. An unwritten
compromise was accepted by Roosevelt and Kelley. Roosevelt
recognized the Soviet government without settling all the
outstanding problems. Kelley forced further negotiations to
bring about a just settlement of the debt issue. Given the
personalities involved, any other solution was impossible.
Perhaps if either man had been free to follow his natural
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inclinations, America's new relationship with the soviets
would have been different. Kelley might have hammered out
an agreement in private conferences prior to recognition.
Roosevelt would possibly have accepted some token amount in
order to satisfy the American public. As it was, the debt
issue was not settled and the ensuing problems angered both
governments and further aggravated the old fears.
There was a broader issue at stake during the summer
and autumn months of 1933. The united states was finally
accepting the fact that it was possible for two different
economic and political systems to peacefUlly coexist in the
world. That was a mental as well as diplomatic
breakthrough. There is something ironic in the fact, that
in the depth of a depression, America at last gained enough
confidence in herself to believe that a capitalistic country
and a socialistic country could peacefully share the same
planet. There is also a historical sadness that it took
America sixteen years to make that discovery, for the
compounded distrust of those years made the future sharing
of the same planet difficult. The anti-communist and anti-
capitalist philosophies, which had developed as a result of
this diplomatic isolation, had become deeply imbedded in the
collective psyche of the peoples of both countries. Under
these circumstances, official recognition had little chance
of erasing sixteen years of distrust. Neither Roosevelt nor
Kelley seemed aware of this in November 1933. To them,
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